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CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION 
Land is a major input into agricultural production and a major 
asset to many producers. Because land purchase invariably involves debt 
financing, land contract or mortgage debt similarly appears as a major 
liability on many producers' balance sheets. The dramatic increase in 
land prices over the last 10 years has had, in fact, a significant 
impact on both sides of the balance sheet. To owners of land, the price 
increases have led to an increase in their asset values and net worths. 
To would-be owners, the price increases have either thwarted their 
atteiq>ts to purchase land or have forced them to finance, through debt, 
an increasingly larger proportion of the value of the land they have 
been able to purchase. 
The growth in the use of land contracts with their traditionally 
smaller down-payment requirements has facilitated this rise in leverage. 
Another factor that has, at least potentially, contributed to the rise 
in leverage is the provision of the Farm Credit Act of 1971 that allowed 
the Federal Land Bank to make loans of up to 85 percent of the market 
value rather than 65 percent of the normal agricultural value of 
farm land.^ Since, in times of rising prices, market values typically 
exceed normal agricultural value, the provision substantially increased 
the potential availability of debt financing throu^ Federal Land Bank 
mortgages. It was assumed that the liberalization of down-payment terms 
would allow FLB lenders more discretion in making loans and that young. 
eigrlcultural value reflects appraised value. 
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low-equity farmers might have better access to real estate credit. 
Whether this has, in fact, occurred, is subject to empirical verification, 
but equally important is the contention that liberalized down-payment 
terms have an impact on the price of farm land. 
The latter hypothesis, roughly stated, is that higher loan-to-value 
ratios in land purchases have resulted in higher land prices. Lower 
down-payment requirements can increase both the number of qualified buyers 
and die levering power of existing equity, thus increasing the effective 
demand for farm land. The extent to which this might occur would depend 
not only on the willingness of lenders to lend at higher loan-to-value 
ratios, but also on the willingness of buyers to borrow proportionately 
larger sums to purchase land. Borrowers may be assumed to contençlate 
an optimal level of loan-to-value in land purchase that exists 
independently of lender imposed limits. This optimum is a function of 
a number of factors with the borrower's initial wealth position and his 
regard for risk being foremost among them. In the case of farm borrowing, 
the age of the borrower is often deemed inçortant. Younger farmers 
typically have less equity than older farmers. Farm businesses, 
especially sole proprietorships, may follow a "life cycle" in ^ Aich the 
first stage of the cycle is accompanied by heavy borrowing and succeeding 
stages by debt repayment and rising equity. Regardless of the age of 
the farmer, his decision to acquire assets is made not only in 
reference to an optimal set of assets, but to an optimal mixture of 
debt and equity as well. This debt-equity mix determines the financial 
structure of the borrower's operation. 
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It is the purpose of this study to examine the effect of the 
interrelationship between farm financial structure and mortgage and 
contract down-payment terms on the price and ownership of agricultural 
land. The study will focus on the behavior of the farm decision maker, 
both as a demander of land and as a demander of debt financing. 
An important assunq>tion will be ençloyed and developed throughout 
the course of the study. Decision makers will be assumed to be 
constrained in investment and production decisions by limited money 
capital. Money capital is differentiated here frmn real or physical 
capital. It is not a productive asset such as land or labor; in fact, 
in an accounting sense, it consists of the farm firm's liabilities and 
net worth. Its availability, however, imposes a constraint on the 
purchase of real assets. The importance of this assunçtion is that the 
conditions under lAich money capital is made available to a decision maker 
can have an impact on input selection. 
Demand functions for inputs, as typically derived from profit 
maximization equations, do not reflect the inçact of money capital 
scarcity or the desired financial structure. Most firms, be they sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations, face some type of money 
capital constraint. Sole proprietors do not possess unlimited equity, 
nor do corporations face perfectly elastic equity supply curves. The 
st^ply of debt capital to a firm can similarly become sharply inelastic 
at hi^er debt/equity ratios. The constraint, however, is not 
necessarily imposed externally, but may instead be internal to the firm. 
The equity en^loyed in a particular investment or in total m^ be less 
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than that potentially available. Likewise, for a given level of equity, 
the amount of debt capital used may be far less than that available at 
no significant increase in cost. The degree to lAich these constraints 
impinge on the input and output decisions of the firm is not captured 
in the standard model of firm behavior. A complete model of firm behavior 
would examine not only the production decisions, but also the level of 
capital investment and the method of financing that investment. 
As noted earlier, the particular interest of this study is the 
development of such a model to explain the demand and thus, the price 
paid for agricultural land within the context of both money capital 
scarcity and farm financial structure. In pursuing optimality in 
financial structure, as well as in output level and input mix, the 
decision maker will find that developments in the debt market can 
influence both the total asset value of his operaticm and the composition 
of those assets. The model of decision maker behavior that will be 
developed will examine the demand for productive inputs under the 
condition of an exogenously determined debt level. While this 
formulation may lose some of the detail that would be present if total 
debt were a decision variable, it does recognize Hie fact that many land 
market transactions are impeded by the lack of availability of external 
financing. Furthermore, even vbea the total debt decision is endogenous 
to the firm, it may be made prior to the input eiiçlo3m>ent decision 
rather than simultaneously with it. A firm could select a debt-equity 
combination that minimizes its cost of capital, thus optimizing its 
leverage decision and then make its production decisions based on its 
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predetermined cost of capital. Therefore, treating the debt level as 
exogenous in no vay invalidates the contention that financial structure 
and input choice are interrelated. 
Because land price is influenced by supply as well as demand, 
assumptions will be made about the conditions under vbich farm land is made 
available for sale. Given the model of decision maker behavior and the 
assumptions about land supply, hypotheses about the intact of down-payment 
terms on the ownership and price of farm land can be made and tested. 
Chapter II presents a review of the relevant literature. This 
review is meant to be representative, not eidiaustive. It considers the 
results of research on the determinants of farm land values, the impact 
of buyer characteristics on land bid prices and the demand for farm 
mortgage debt. It also considers previous studies of firm behavior in 
the presence of money capital scarcity. 
Chapter III examines the theoretical basis for firm behavior under 
money capital scarcity. A specific model is presented and comparative 
static results are derived. 
Chapter 17 follows with a brief discussion of the data set used in 
the empirical analysis. This chapter includes a discussion of how 
problems with the data set are handled and how further data needs m^ 
be met. 
The specification of the ençirical model, along with a discussion 
of the statistics, and a sumnary of the research are the subjects of 
Chapters V and VI, respectively. The latter chapter also suggests 
limitations of the present research and areas of future inquiry. 
6 
CHAPTER II. BEVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The relevant literature for an investigation of the relationship 
between financing and land prices can be grouped into three distinct 
categories. First is the literature that deals with factors affecting 
land values. Within this category are studies that atten^t to pinpoint 
the major variables influencing land values, as well as studies that 
infer the value of farm land from the willingness and ability of buyers 
to pay. These studies bear examination because they suggest a role for 
both financial structure and down-payment terms in the determination of 
land values. The second category of relevant literature includes studies 
that deal more specifically with the market and the demand for mortgage 
credit. These studies center on the role of credit terms in the demand 
for both mortgage credit itself and on the demand for land. The third 
and final category of relevant literature deals not specifically with 
the demand for land and mortgage debt, but with the theoretical links 
between decisions on output level, input mix, and financial structure. 
The Impact of Financial Variables on Land Values 
Reynolds and Timmons [1969] examine factors affecting farm land 
values in the United States. The authors propose that credit 
availability, by affecting entry into and exit from farming, can also 
affect the price paid for farm land. They note that the price of farm 
land and the value of farm land, lAile equal under conditions of pure 
conçetition, m^ not be equal under actual circumstances encountered in 
the land market. They define value as an estimate of the worth of a 
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tract of land in the minds of buyers and sellers in a theoretical 
analysis and as an estimate of price in the empirical analysis [Reynolds 
and Timmons, 1969, p. 331]. Demand for land is defined as the sum of 
the various direct and derived demands for land, and supply of land is 
defined as that amount available for use at any given time as reflected 
in the number of farm land transfers. 
Low cash reserves and hi^ down-payment requirements inhibit the 
demand for land, while low-equity financing can add to demand. The 
impact of credit availability, therefore, on the price of farm land is 
hypothesized to be positive. The more freely available is credit, other 
things being equal, the higher the price of farm land. 
The models estimated by Reynolds and Timmons include both a time-
series model for the years 1933 to 1965 and cross-sectional models for 
the years 1940, 1950, 1954, and 1959. The time-series model consisted of 
two equations for the U.S. as a whole; the first equation defining 
farm land transfers and the second equation, farm land value. The 
predicted number of transfers enter the second equation as an independent 
variable. Variables representing financing terms for farm land purchases 
never enter the time-series equation, although the ratio of farm 
mortgage debt to total equity is included in the equation estimating the 
number of farm transfers. The impact of this debt-to-equil7 ratio on 
transfers is negative and the authors reason that a weakening debt 
position, as reflected in an increasing debt-to-equity ratio, reduces the 
ability of farmers to purchase land, thus reducing the number of potential 
buyers and the number of farm transfers. The debt-to-equity ratio also 
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appears in the reduced form time-series equation estimating farm land 
value. The sign of the variable is positive. The explanation is that the 
rise in the debt-to-equity ratio, reflecting a poor debt position, is 
coincident with tighter credit which, in turn, reduces the number of farm 
land transfers and increases the price of farm land. 
The cross-section equation is estimated across states. Since the 
debt-to-equity ratio is not available on a state-by-state basis, the 
variable, debt-to-value-of-farm-land is used instead. Unlike the time-
series case in which an increasing debt-to-equity ratio represents, over 
time, a worsening of the debt position, the increasing debt-to-farm-land 
value ratio in the cross-section case is believed to indicate greater 
availability of credit and a hi^er rate of voluntary farm land 
transfers. Since the intact of voluntary transfers on land value is 
negative, the ultimate affect of an increase in the debt-to-value ratio 
on land values is also reasoned to be negative. 
In all cases, the signs of the finance-related variables are as 
hypothesized and the variables themselves are deemed statistically 
significant. Despite this, Reynolds and Timmons shed little light on the 
intact of farm financial structure or down-payment terms on current farm 
land prices. In the case of the time-series model, they appear to be 
capturing some financial structure effect by relating total mortgage debt 
to total equity to the number of voluntary transfers, viiile in the cross-
section study, the variable included more closely resembles a measure of 
down payment. In periods of rapid farm land price increases, both 
variables would seem to be positively related to variation in farm land 
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values.^ Other problems, mentioned by the authors, create further 
difficulty with the estimates. The data used for the analysis are too 
highly aggregated to effectively isolate the inçact of farm financial 
structure. Furthermore, multicollinearity reduces the efficacy of the 
estimated coefficients regardless of their having the "correct" signs. 
In a test specifically designed to reveal the intact of finance 
teinns on farm land values, Herr [1975] presents an econometric model of 
the farm land market. His model consists of a single equation vhich 
includes three sets of variables. The first set of variables describes 
the characteristics of the tract of land, the second set describes the 
characteristics of the buyer and seller, and the third set describes the 
characteristics of the finance terms. Among the variables describing 
the individual tract are tract productivity and the percentage of the 
tract that is cultivable. The second group of variables includes the 
reasons for buying and selling, respectively. The purchase of land for 
nonagricultural uses is expected to buoy the price of land, ^ ile sales 
made for the purpose of settling estates or providing emergency cash are 
expected to depress prices. The variables describing financial 
characteristics are the ratio of loan to present market value of 
security, the percentage of purchase price financed, the term of loan, 
and the ratio of acres appraised to acres in the sale tract. 
^In a study by Pope ^  al, [1979], a reestimation of the Reynolds 
and Timmons equations using data for the years 1946 to 1972 yields a 
positive coefficient for the debt-to-equity ratio in the time-series 
transfer equation. 
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Herr's hypothesis regarding finance terms is that they have no added 
or separate impact on price. They are viewed as either hastening or 
slowing adjustments that would have taken place anyway. The real cause 
of price increases is the divergence between the return to land and the 
market rate of interest on loans to finance the purchase of land. As 
long as the former exceeds the latter, excess demand for land will tend 
to push its price upward. To the extent that liberal loan terms, such 
as low down payments and longer amortization periods allow more buyers 
to enter the market for land, the adjustment in prices will be hastened 
[Herr, 1975, pp. 153-154]. 
The cross-sectional statistical model was estimated twice for 
each of two groups of sample data, actual farm sales in Iowa and 
actual farm sales in South Dakota. In the first estimate, only the land 
characteristic and buyer-seller characteristic variables were included. 
In the second estimate, the finance variables were added. The conclusion 
drawn from the estimations was that the finance variables have no 
separate Impact on the selling price of farm land in either the Iowa or 
South Dakota cases. Only one of the finance variables in one of the 
equations proved statistically significant. 
Herr's analysis is ultimately unsatisfying if only for the fact 
that it explains so little (about one-half) of the total variation in 
purchase price per acre. In addition, however, the author would have 
done well to keep in mind the distinction between land value as a 
theoretical concept and land price as an observable fact. While 
economic theory may suggest that land value would not be influenced. 
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under competitive conditions, by finance terms, land prices, which in an 
imperfect world diverge from land values, may well be affected by terms 
such as the down-payment percentage and the term of the loan. Herr 
recognizes this in saying that changes in finance terms may speed or 
retard adjustments in the land market. The change in the rate of 
adjustment would presumably be reflected in actual sale prices. 
Lee and Rask [1976] take an innovative approach to the study of 
land price determination. They propose to look at the land purchase 
decision within the context of a capital-budgeting problem. The study 
does not attempt to test the significance of variables determining land 
values. Instead, it suggests a method by which researchers may determine 
the maximum bid price a buyer could offer for a tract of land. The 
variables shown to be relevant to this bid price decision might be used 
in a study of actual land sales. 
The authors argue that the traditional income valuation approach 
to valuing land may be inapplicable in most cases because it assumes a 
constant net annual rent over time, a constant capitalization rate to 
discount earnings and a very long time horizon. Their model includes, 
as key variables, income expectations and the decision maker's 
opportunity cost of capital. The standard capital budgeting criterion 
applies to the model. The purchase of farm land is an acceptable 
investment if its net present value is equal to or greater than zero. 
The credit terms included in the formulation are the proportion of 
purchase price paid down, the nominal rate of interest charged on the 
loan, and the amortization period of the loan. The authors find that 
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the financing terms seem to be of some importance in determining the bid 
price an individual would be willing to make on land. Â high down-payment 
requirement, in particular, results in a lowering of the maximum bid 
price. Assuming an interest rate on a first mortgage of 10 percent per 
annum, an individual able to fully lever the land purchase can afford to 
pay $1,262 per acre compared to $964 per acre for the buyer who, ceteris 
paribus, pays cash. As noted by the authors, this leverage affect will 
occur only if the opportunity cost of capital exceeds the after-tax rate 
of interest on the mortgage [Lee and Rask, 1976, p. 987]. The 
opportunity cost of capital is likewise an important determinant in the 
Ttiflv-iTinini bid price. As the cost of capital rises, the maximum bid price is 
shown to fall. The cost of capital reflects, in the capital budgeting 
context, the return on an asset necessary to justify raising the funds to 
purchase it [Lewellen, 1969, p. 6], As the necessary return rises, other 
things being equal, the affordable price of the asset falls. 
Through the use of the capital budgeting procedure, Lee and Rask 
make explicit the link between firm financial structure and demand for 
assets. It is the presence of the cost of capital in the formulation 
that creates this link. The cost of capital, itself influenced by the 
financial structure of the firm, in turn, has an iiiq>act on the maxitmim 
bid price for farm land. 
The determination of the maximum bid price on agricultural land was 
also the object of an earlier paper by Harris and Nehring [1976]. Their 
model included several variables of relevance to the present study. One 
of these was the variability in before-tax income as measured by the 
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variance of before-tax income. Since this variance is a reflection of 
risk, both business and financial, and since financial risk is directly 
related to leverage, the level of the variance in before-tax income is 
influenced by the degree of financial leverage. Furthermore, given the 
positive relationship between financial leverage and the cost of capital, 
a rise in the cost of capital may be assumed to reflect increased risk. 
Given the negative intact of variance on bid price, a rise in the cost 
of capital can be said to lover the maximum bid price, a result «holly 
consistent with Lee and Rask. 
The second explanatory variable of interest vas the initial wealth 
level of the decision maker. The authors' hypothesis with respect to 
this variable was that an increase, ceteris paribus, in the initial wealth 
position would result in a higher mmxirnim bid price if the decision maker 
were decreasingly risk averse over wealth. A lower maximum bid price 
would result if the decision maker were increasingly risk averse, but with 
a constant degree of risk aversion, a change in the initial wealth 
position would have no impact [Harris and Nehring, 1976, p. 163]. 
A numerical illustration was provided to test the bid price model. 
The average equity of Iowa cash grain farms was calculated for each 
size category, 0 through IV, category 0 being the largest in terms of 
number of acres. A measure of risk aversion, necessary for the numerical 
illustration, vas also calculated under the assumption of decreasing 
risk aversion over wealth. The result of the illustration vas that the 
level of initial equity was shown to have a positive intact on the 
maximum bid price for farm land. Given the bid price of any particular 
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size category of farm, the bid price of a decision maker ^ose operation 
had all the characteristics of that particular size category, except a 
lover initial equity, was consistently smaller. Aa important conclusion 
of the study vas that the impacts of other variables, not discussed 
here, mitigated, to some extent, the bidding advantage enjoyed by 
high-equity operators. 
One other study is of interest at this point. Reinsel [1973] 
questioned Aether the growth in seller financing of land has tended to 
increase land prices. Seller contract financing typically requires a 
smaller dovn payment than mortgage financing so that any impact that 
increased seller financing has had might also apply to the liberalization 
of mortgage lending terms. 
Reinsel reasoned that since the seller is really interested in the 
after-tax present value of the contract, price is only one of the relevant 
variables. Financing terms including interest rate, dovn-payment 
percentage and amortization period, as veil as the seller's discount rate, 
can also influence present value. Thus, varying combinations of price 
and financing terms can yield the same after-tax present value. 
Differences in the terms of mortgage versus contract sale arise from 
the differential tax treatment of the tvo. Capital gains on land 
contract sales can be distributed over the life of the contract as long 
as the dovn payment is less than 30 percent of the purchase price. This 
tax advantage results in the interest rate on contracts generally being 
lover than that on mortgages. If this has, in fact, been the case and 
assuming that lover interest rates require a higiher price to maintain a 
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constant present value, then the use of seller financing may have 
resulted in prices being hi^er than they otherwise would have been. 
Reinsel has no hard evidence of the intact of seller financing. He 
states that if it is assumed that the discount rate on future principal 
and interest payments are approximately equal to the mortgage rate of 
interest then selling price does indeed increase with seller financing.^ 
Enqploying the model he has developed and assuming that the market rate of 
interest on seller contracts is as much as 1.5 percentage points below 
the rate for mortgages, then the existence of seller financing may have 
raised land prices by as much as 10 percent. 
As it turns out, the analogy between increased incidence of seller 
financing with its lower down-payment percentage, and liberalized 
mortgage lending terms, breaks down because of the difference in tax 
treatment. The analogy that might be suggested, however, is that just 
as the seller is interested in more than simply the price per acre of 
land, the buyer, in contemplating his purchase, is also aware of more 
than the price per acre. He is aware of the total acquisition costs 
of the land \Aiich are influenced by the financing terms and his current 
financial structure. 
The Market for Mortgage Debt 
The second area of relevant literature deals with the determinants 
of loan demand for land purchase. A well-known study by Hesser and 
discounting at a lower rate would result in a higher present value 
and thus require a lower selling price to maintain equality of present 
value. 
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Schuh [1962] represents an early attençt at an econometric model of 
the demand for farm mortgage credit. The authors' intent was not to 
explain land prices or values, but to explain the gross flow of mortgage 
credit into agriculture. Mortgage credit is needed to finance the 
acquisition of new capital, to finance the transfer of existing capital 
and to refinance an existing mortgage or contract. Amnng the important 
variables included by the authors in their model are the "price" of 
credit, proxied, in their case, by the interest rate on farm mortgages; 
and the rate of savings in agriculture, which is used as a measure of 
internally generated funds available for capital acquisition.^ Other 
variables are included to capture the derived nature of mortgage credit 
demand, derived, that is, from the demand for farm land. These variables 
consisted of the farm labor wage rate, a measure of technological progress, 
and a measure of expected prices. 
Three separate equations were estimated. Variables common to each 
were the interest rate, the level of internal funds, the farm wage 
rate, and the technology variable. Each equation also included variables 
unique to itself, such as the number of farm transfers, the quantity of 
farm mortgage credit lagged one year, and the stock of farm mortgage 
debt at the beginning of the year. 
The authors encountered some problems in the statistical estimation 
of the equation. The period of time over ^ ich the equation was 
estimated, 1921 to 1959, considered necessary for full identification of 
^erm to maturity and size of down payment are other elements of the 
"price" of a loan. 
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the model, was of such a length as to make the authors suspect structural 
change in the credit market. The identification problem itself vas not 
solved since empirical evidence led the authors to believe that both 
the supply and demand curves for farm mortgage credit had shifted over 
the period of the analysis. 
Despite these and other problems, the results of the analysis were 
revealing in that they showed the demand for farm mortgage credit to be 
influenced by the interest rate, the volume of internal funds available, 
the level of technology and the farm wage rate. Short-run elasticities 
for the first three variables were greater than one in absolute value 
and negative in sign indicating that farm mortgage credit demand would 
increase with a decrease in the "price" of credit, a decrease in 
internal funds availability and a decrease in the level of technology. 
The latter may be more appropriately stated as follows: an increase in 
technology, allowing more substitution in production, leads to a 
decrease in t^e demand for mortgage credit. The short-run elasticity 
of demand for mortgage credit with respect to the farm wage rate, also 
greater than one in absolute value, was positive in sign. The conclusion 
regarding the farm wage rate is that as labor costs increase, land tends 
to be substituted and thus, the demand for credit increases. 
Lins [1972] presented a model for estimating net changes in farm 
real estate debt by lending institution. He confined his definition of 
loan demand to those loans secured for the purchase or inçrovement of 
farm real estate assets. Thus, he did not consider those loans secured 
by real estate but used for non-real estate or nonfarm uses. The 
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lending institutions considered were the Farmer's Home Administration, 
the Federal Land Bank, private insurance companies, commercial bankers, 
and other individuals. A separate demand and supply equation was 
specified for each lending institution, the aggregate demand for farm 
mortgage loans being the sum of the loan demands for each individual 
institution. The variables chosen for the demand equation included the 
cost of borrowing, net farm plus nonfarm income, capital appreciation 
on farm real estate and the ratio of money balances to gross production 
expenses. The variables included in the supply function differed by 
lending institution, but included, in each case, some measure of interest 
rate received on loans, the spread between farm mortgage loans and 
alternative investment opportunities and the total potential funds 
available from that lending source. The demand for Federal Land Bank 
loans was estimated by ordinary least squares, while the demand for loans 
from commercial banks, life insurance companies and individuals were 
estimated by two-stage least squares. ^ The demand for FHA loans was not 
estimated, but was assumed to represent congressional appropriations 
for FHA direct lending. 
The results, although troubled by frequent statistical insignificance 
of variables and occasional contrariness of signs, suggested that 
elasticities of demand for credit varied by lending institution. Lins 
had hypothesized a highly inelastic demand at the aggregate level. The 
^A supply estimate was not made for the Federal Land Bank because 
it is a cooperative and the quantity supplied is primarily determined by 
the quantity demanded [Lins, 1972, p. 4]. 
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own price elasticity of demand for Federal Land Banks, for exançle, was 
-0.10, while that for life insurance conpaixies was -8.37 [Lins, 1972, 
p. 6]. Mother interesting result was that net changes in real estate 
debt were more sensitive to changes in income than to capital 
appreciation. The supply of real estate debt turned out to be sensitive 
to the yield differential on alternative investment opportunities. 
Theoretical Antecedents 
The most comprehensive treatment of the interrelationship among 
production, investment, and financing decisions is found in 
Vickers [1968]. Vickers presents three summary propositions that he feels 
are warranted by his analysis. First, the theories of production and 
capital, \Aiich developed along disparate lines, need to be shown as 
mutually relevant and logical only insofar as they take each other into 
consideration. Second, firms can attain an optimal structure of assets 
through investment choice and an optimal structure of liabilities through 
choice of financing method. Achievement of these optima is 
consequential to both product output and factor input selection. Finally, 
capital use and availability have an impact on the optimal mix of 
capital with other factors in a production process, an impact that 
extends to the conditions under which firms grow. 
The general model advanced by Vickers is of the following form: 
max (j, = [p(Q)f(X,Y) - - r(D)D] (2.1) 
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subject to: 
K + D = g(Q) + aX + py (2.2) 
where p = equity owner's capitalization rate shown to be 
functionally dependent on D, the total amount of debt 
capital en^loyed by the firm; 
p = unit selling price of the firm's output shown here to be 
dependent on the quantity of output sold; 
X,Y = input factors of production, described more precisely as 
the number of units of the respective factor capacities 
employed; 
= unit factor costs of inputs X and Y, respectively; 
r = average rate of interest on total debt employed by the 
firm; 
K = amount of equity coital employed by the firm, given and 
fixed; 
g(Q) = net working capital requirement function which describes 
the firm's net investment in working capital to be a 
function of the level of production; and 
a,B= money capital requirement coefficients of factors X and 
Y, respectively, indicating, for example, that for each 
unit of factor Y capacity enqtloyed by the firm, an 
investment in fixed assets of g dollars is required. 
The maximand <|) represents the before-tax profits of the firm, 
discounted by the owner's capitalization rate. The capitalization rate, 
p, has the form 
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p = a + MKP" (2.3) 
2 lAich makes it a linear function of a , the variance of expected profits. 
The parameter "a" reflects the "risk free" rate of return, while "w" 
reflects owner attitude toward risk. The capitalization rate is said to 
be functionally dependent on total debt capital employed by the firm. 
This dependency results from the impact of financial leverage on the 
variance of expected profits. With a given equity base, an increase in 
debt use, with its concomitant rise in fixed interest charges, increases 
the variance in expected profits. For exançle, with N referring to net 
income, and 0 and H to net operating income and total interest on debt 
capital, respectively, 
N = 0 - M (2.4) 
or, in terms of expected values, 
E(K) = E(0) - M . (2.5) 
Assuming that 
VaxCN) = Var(O), (2.6) 
then 
*N " ^0 * (2.7) 
and the coefficient of variation of net income, defined as o^/E(N) can 
also be written 
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\ ~ E(0)-rD (2"*) 
where rD = M, the total interest on debt capital. The coefficient of 
variation, a measure of risk, rises with increases in rD. Recalling 
the form of p, the capitalization rate, 
p = a + (2.9) 
then, 
dp = 2wjdCT . (2.10) 
Substituting the coefficient of variation, for the variance 
2 in expected profits, c , then, 
dVjj = i da (2.11) 
and 
Therefore, 
or 
do- = NdVjj . (2.12) 
dp = 2wcrNdVjj (2.13) 
dp = ZwN^jjdVjj (2.14) 
since a = V^. Taking the indefinite integral of the last equation 
with respect to p. 
p = . (2.15) 
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Thus, the capitalization rate will vary directly with the coefficient of 
variation. 
The constraint imposed on the objective function represents a 
limitation on the availability of money capital. Money capital arises 
from two sources: owner's equity and debt. Money capital requirements 
likewise arise from two sources, one being the need for working capital 
to bridge the time gap between expenditures and receipts that occur 
during production. Working capital, usually identified as the excess of 
current assets over current liabilities, is considered a function of the 
level of output of the firm. The second use of money capital is in the 
investment in fixed assets. In a world where factor services are not 
ccmpletely variable, some investment in fixed assets, \diich provide a 
flow of factor services over their lifetime, is required. These 
investments, necessary to the production of output by the firm, call 
for money capital. The money capital requirement measures the 
investment necessary to secure the fixed asset. Vickers' model of firm 
behavior is constrained such that money capital requirements must not 
exceed the firm's money capital supply from debt and equity sources. 
Since the total money coital requirement is dependent on the level of 
output and the level and combination of inputs, it cannot be known for 
certain until output decisions are made. But, in the face of money 
capital scarcity, the optimal level of output and the optimal level and 
combination of inputs must be influenced by both sides of the constraint 
equation. Thus, in Vickers' model, the production and investment 
decisions are simultaneous. 
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Utilizing the Lagrangian method in taking derivatives with respect 
to the decision variables in the model, X, Y and D and the Lagrangian 
multiplier, p,, yields not only the firm's demand for inputs X and Y, 
but also, with K fixed, its optimal capital budget and its optimal 
debt-equity ratio. 
It is possible, as Vickers points out in a subsequent article 
[Vickers, 1970], to determine the optimal level of equity as well, thus 
achieving lAat the author terms the optimum optimorum. For a given level 
of equity, the marginal productivity of money capital, given by ji, the 
Lagrangian constraint, measures the value of additional debt. Once the 
optimal amount of debt for a given level of equity is obtained, the 
marginal productivity of money capital becomes a measure of the value of 
additional equity. At the optimum optimorum, p, is equal to one. 
A similar model was developed by lumovsky [1970], but with an 
emphasis on the case in which both debt and equity levels are chosen in 
conjunction with factor-outputs [Tumovsky, 1970, p. 1061]. The model he 
employs optimizes the firm's net discounted present value subject to the 
capital requirement constraint. The optimization yields the desired 
level and mix of factor inputs, the desired combination of debt and 
equity financing and the demand level of the capital budget, i.e. the 
sum of total debt and equity employed by the firm. 
Tumovsky also indicates how the firm can reach its long-run 
equilibrium through a sequential process rather than the simultaneous 
process described by Vickers. The firm first selects its optimal 
financial structure by choosing the leverage ratio that minimizes its 
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cost of capital. The cost of capital enters the input demand equations 
and, given output price and factor costs, determines the optimal 
production level. The production decision, in turn, determines the 
optimal capital budget or in the case of the firm as a whole, the total 
level of assets [Tumovslqr, 1970, p. 1070]. 
One final issue raised by Tumovsky is an examination of how, under 
the assumption of a given initial level of equity, a firm would respond, 
in terms of its debt use, to changes in that level of equity. In other 
words, the analysis suggests under what conditions a firm will regard 
debt and equity as complements and under what conditions it will regard 
them as substitutes. His conclusion is that the Initial level of equity 
itself determines the outcome. If the initial level is small, the firm 
will regard equity and debt as cos^lements. If the initial level is 
large, it will regard the two financing sources as substitutes. If K 
happens to be at its long-run equilibrium and the firm can borrow at a 
rate of interest independent of the leverage ratio, debt and equity can 
be regarded as substitutes. If the rate of interest rises with the 
leverage ratio, it is possible for debt and equity to be viewed as 
complements [Tumovsky, 1970, p. 1078], 
Related work in the area of agricultural finance was reported by 
Baker [1968a]. He asserts the inadequacy of the condition 
-dXj r 
- îj (2.W) 
to determine the optimal contination of inputs and in the 
production of output. He proposes, instead, the following condition. 
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-dX2 Pi + Fi 
(2.17) 
4=1 " *2 + *2 ' 
\diere and Fg represent the marginal cost of financing each unit of 
and respectively. According to Baker, the necessity of having 
to finance the purchase of inputs is important in that it lessens a 
farmer's liquidity through the absorption of his credit, i.e. his unused 
borrowing capacity. Liquidity is an inçortant resource to the farmer. 
While not appearing as an asset on his balance sheet, it is nevertheless, 
important as it provides a response to uncertainty. To the extent that 
the marginal financing costs, the F^'s in Baker's formulation, reflect 
more than just the interest rates charged on loans for different inputs. 
Baker's equilibrium condition is consistent with the work of Vickers and 
Tumovslq^. If, for example, the F^'s reflect loan limits on the purchase 
of different inputs, a suggestion the author himself makes, then the 
condition establishes a link between financial structure and input mix. 
If it is assumed that the ratio of input financing costs is equal to the 
ratio of input prices, then the input mix would be the same whether or 
not the purchase had to be financed. But, if the ratios are different, a 
more likely situation in Baker's opinion, then the necessity of having to 
finance input purchases will have, at least potentially, an impact on 
the input mix. 
In a subsequent paper. Baker [1968b] employs his earlier analysis in 
an attençt to explain \âiy farmers typically want to own land instead of 
lease it and lAy they would finance land purchases with a mortgage 
rather than a land contract. The cost-minimizing choices would seem to 
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be to lease rather than buy and to finance with a land contract rather 
than a mortgage. Building on the ideas of his earlier paper. Baker 
suggests that because farmers value liquidity and that because credit is 
a source of liquidity, the land acquisition method that farmers choose 
may be that method that supports the most credit. Equity in land 
financed with a conventional mortgage typically supports more credit 
than equity in land financed with a land contract. Land leases, of 
course, offer no additional credit base to the farmer. 
Baker never mentions the existence of a money capital requirement 
for inputs, but he does view the production problem as one of constrained 
optimization. Farmers maintain a capital structure that satisfies their 
liquidity needs as well as their production goals. Equity provides 
borrowing capacity which represents a source of liquidity to the farmer. 
Unused borrowing capacity, or credit, provides a "line of defense" 
against uncertainty. Therefore, in selecting inputs, farmers may be 
responsive to the terms under which those inputs can be financed. Inputs 
with higher lending limits (lower down payments) may be favored over 
those with lower lending limits, ceteris paribus, since the greater 
absorption of credit by the latter imposes a cost on the farmer in terms 
of decreased liquidity. This decreased liquidity might be reflected in 
a higher capitalization rate in a valuation model such as that specified 
by Vickers. 
Sunsnary 
As mentioned previously, this review is meant to be representative, 
not exhaustive. There exists an extensive literature on the factors that 
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determine farm land values. While financial variables are often assigned 
a significant role, few studies have centered on these variables or 
examined the theoretical basis for the significance of the down-payment 
percentage in the formation of farm land prices. Fever still have 
offered empirical evidence. The highly aggregated data used in empirical 
studies, such as that by Reynolds and Timmons, fail to capture the 
interrelationships among land price, down-payment percentage, and firm 
financial structure. 
The literature on firm behavior under capital scarcity is likewise 
vast. However, few have investigated the impact of money capital 
scarcity, and none have directly addressed the issue of the impact of 
capital structure on the price of fixed assets. 
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CHAPTER III. A MODEL OF FARM FIRM BEHAVIOR UNDER CONDITIONS 
OF CAPITAL SCARCITY 
Because existing theoretical models are inadequate to investigate 
the issue of capital structure and farm land prices, it is the purpose 
of this chapter to develop a model that establishes that conceptual link. 
The model is based on the work of Vickers, but makes critical adaptations 
to be applicable to the issues of this study. First, the theoretical 
model describing both the objective function and the constraint is 
presented. Second, the model is optimized and conditions necessary for 
acdiieving a constrained maxi-imim solution are derived. Finally, a 
comparative static analysis which examines the impact on the endogenous 
variables of changes in the exogenous variables is presented. 
Specification of the Objective Function 
In a study of six large California farms, Lin et [1974] concluded 
that farmer behavior is more accurately explained by utility maximization 
(specifically, Bemoullian utility) than by profit maximization. Using 
the chi-square goodness-of-fit criterion as their measure, the authors 
showed that the Bemoullian utility formulation provided the most 
accurate prediction of actual cropping patterns among the six farms 
included in the study.^ Their hypothesis was that farmer attitude toward 
risk is the factor which contributes most to the discrepancy between 
actual optimizing behavior and that predicted by profit maximizing 
^The chi-square goodness-of-fit test compares the postulated 
probability distribution with that suggested by the data to determine 
whether they are, in fact, the same. 
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models. Risk is not properly accounted for in conventional profit 
maximizing models, but can easily be incorporated in a utility 
maximizing function. Profit maximization can be regarded as a special 
case of Bemoullian utility maximization, the case in which the 
decision maker has a constant marginal utility of income. 
In addition to the Bemoullian utility function, Lin et [1974] 
also tested a lexicographic utility function which included four goals: 
one representing family living standards; another, the level of firm 
growth; a third, net income; and the fourth, the degree of risk aversion. 
In the context of lexicographic utility, the decision maker is assumed to 
maximize (or minimize) the least important goal subject to satisfactory 
levels of the other goals [Lin et al., 1974, p. 503]. The lexicographic 
utility formulation, as it turned out, performed only slightly better 
than the profit maximization formulation. 
The suggestion of the Lin et al. [1974] study and of earlier studies 
[officer and Halter, 1968; Dillon and Anderson, 1971; and Massell and 
Johnson, 1968] is that farm decision makers act as utility maximizers 
rather than profit maximizers. Utility can be defined as a function of 
"returns" and "risks"; more specifically, a function of expected returns 
such that 
U = F(R, a^) (3.1) 
and 
> 0, Fg < 0 (3.2) 
^ere U = utility, R = expected returns, = risk of returns and F^ and 
F 2 represent the changes in the utility function with respect to R and 
2 
a , respectively. This view of farmer behavior accords well with the 
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general formulation of Vickers. The model specified by Vicbers defines 
vhat is termed the "economic value of ownership" [Vicbers, 1968, p. 8]. 
Recalling the form of the objective function, 
max <1) = Cp(Q)f(X,Y) - - r(D)D] (3.3) 
where all symbols are as defined previously, the variable being maximized 
is the return to the owners of the firm, in Vickers' case, the firm's 
stockholders. Consequently, gross revenue must be reduced not only by 
input costs, but by interest expense as well. This specification allows 
the full consideration of the impact of the method of financing on the 
return to ownership. Because utility is a positive function of returns, 
the model specification forges a link between the objective function and 
the generalized utility function. 
The equity owner's capitalization rate, p, as discussed in Chapter 11 
above, is a function of, among other factors, the variability of the 
firm's returns. It is defined as 
2 p = a + w (3.4) 
2 
where a represents the variance in returns. Assuming that utility is 
a negative function of the variance in returns, the presence of the 
capitalization rate confiâtes the link between Vickers* objective function 
and a generalized utility function. Recalling from Chapter II that the 
variance in returns to the residual owner is magnified by an increase in 
financial leverage, then the capitalization rate is also shown to be an 
increasing function of the degree of financial leverage. 
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The capitalization rate represents the rate of return on equity 
capital that the stockholder deems necessary to maintain his or her 
ownership in the firm. It is defined so as to reflect the amount of 
debt in the firm's financial structure. As the proportion of debt-to-
equity increases, ceteris paribus, the equity owner, as residual claimant, 
evaluates the return from investment in the firm at a higher rate to 
account for the increased variance in that return. 
The equity owner's capitalization rate can be regarded as a cœiponent 
of the firm's cost of capital. As usually conceived, the cost of capital 
is a weighted average of the firm's cost of debt and equity capital, 
respectively. The firm's cost of equity is equivalent to the equity 
owner's capitalization rate. As the unlevered firm adds more debt to its 
capital structure, ceteris paribus, its cost of capital will likely 
decrease, the cost of debt capital being less than the cost of equity 
capital. This result occurs despite the rise in the cost of equity 
occasioned by the increase in debt use. After a certain point, however, 
the cost of capital will rise as the increase in debt use pressures both 
debt and equity costs upward. 
The transition from corporation to sole proprietorship, \Aiile calling 
for some modifications, is not difficult. The sole proprietor can be 
considered to have a required rate of return on equity to be used in 
evaluating the worth of capital expenditures to the firm. He would 
likewise use this rate in discounting the total stream of returns to 
equity in the business. The basis for this rate is the same as that for 
a stocldiolder in a corporation. The rate should reflect the owner's or 
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investor's opportunity return; that is, the return required to cover the 
cost of not investing the value of the equity in an alternative 
occupation of comparable risk. This rate could also be adjusted to 
reflect the intact of inflation on future cash flows as an alternative to 
projecting the real value of future cash flows. 
If a stockholder in a conpany finds that better yields are available 
on alternative investments of similar risk, then he would sell his shares 
in that company and purchase shares in another. Similarly, the sole 
proprietor who finds superior investment opportunities in the same risk 
class as his business may liquidate his assets and invest his equity in 
the alternative occupation. Two problems arise that make the analogy 
between stockholder and sole proprietor less than perfect. First, the 
stockholder often faces a liquid securities market in \^idi he can buy and 
sell with relatively small transactions costs. Â proprietor, on the other 
hand, whose equity consists of real as well as financial assets may face 
a much less liquid market. Thus, high transactions costs may lower the 
proprietor's opportunity rate of return as conçared to the stockholder. 
Second, the proprietor may place a value on the return to his equity in 
his business that exceeds the value of the cash returns. The business 
may be thougLt of as providing continued employment and the equity thus 
valued more than a stockholder's equivalent ownership equity in a 
corporation. Despite these differences in the position of stockholders 
versus proprietors, the equity owner's capitalization rate, as envisioned 
by Vickers, would appear to be suitable for use in the present study. 
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Thus, the objective function to be employed in the present study is 
basically that used by Vickers. Some changes have been made to apply 
the model to the issues at hand and to aid in the analysis. The 
objective function is: 
max (J) = i Cp Q - - k X2 - r D] (3.5) 
where 
(|) = the capitalized value of the pre-tax return to the residual (or 
equity owner; 
p = the residual owner's capitalization rate. Given a level of 
equity and a constant level of business risk, the capitalization 
rate varies with the amount of debt employed. It is defined 
as p = a + t D; 
p = the expected selling price of the firm's output; 
Q = the quantity of output produced. Q = f(X^, k where 
and X2 refer to flow and stock inputs, respectively; 
k = the proportion of the total stock of input X2 used in 
production; 
Y^, Y2 = acquisition costs of inputs X^ and X2, respectively; and 
r D = total interest expense, the product of average interest rate on 
debt, r, times total indebtedness, D. 
This model is basically an asset valuation model in ^ Aich the 
maximand represents the present value of the return to the residual 
owner's share of the firm's assets. It could alternatively be expressed 
as 
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(j) = ^  (3.6) 
where E(R) stands for expected returns to the equity owner and p, as 
before, refers to the equity owner's capitalization rate. 
A more realistic asset valuation model mi^t allow for the 
possibility of changes in the level of expected returns through 
consideration of a rate of growth in such returns. In the context of the 
present analysis, which has as its goal an explanation for some of the 
variation in farm real estate prices, this growth aspect may be especially 
relevant. According to Melichar [1979], farm real estate can be compared 
to a "growth stock" where part of the present value of the asset lies in 
expected growth in dividends over the holding period. 
Following Van Home [1974], 
+ (3.7) 
(1+p) (1+p)^ (l#f 
where g represents the expected growth rate in returns and R represents 
dividends, or, in the farm land analogy, cash withdrawals. Assuming 
that p > g, this formula reduces to 
as n 
This formulation suggests that the present value of the residual 
ownership in the firm, (J>, may change with the level of current cash 
withdrawals, R, the rate of growth in those cash withdrawals, g, or the 
discount rate, p. Identifying g as the real rate of growth means that 
it must be adjusted for the effects of general price inflation. 
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Recalling the form of the objective function, the level of expected 
returns in any period can be seen to be a function of the expected 
selling price of output times total output produced minus total variable 
costs, machinery ownership costs, land charges, opportunity returns to 
management and operator labor and return to borrowed capital (interest 
expense). Each of these elements could have an associated expected real 
rate of growth i&ich taken together would determine g, the real rate of 
growth in expected returns. 
Specification of the Money Capital Constraint 
Reference has been made previously to the impact of capital scarcity 
on firm behavior. The requirement that a firm finance the acquisition of 
inputs adds a new feature to the neoclassical model of firm behavior. 
Under conditions of capital saturation and with the freedom to vary 
both output levels and total cost, the firm might maximize the following 
function, 
n = pQ - C (3.9) 
where II refers to profits, pQ refers to total revenue from the sale of 
output Q at price p, and C refers to total costs, both fixed and 
variable. If inputs and available under conditions of pure 
cosçetition, are used in the production process, then Q can be written in 
the form of a production function Q = f(X^, X^) and C, total costs, in 
the form C = r^X^ + r^g + b where r^ and r^ represent unit costs of 
inputs X^ and X2, respectively, and b equals total fixed costs. Thus, 
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n = pf(X^, Eg) - - b (3.10) 
Differentiating with respect to and X^, 
||- = pf^ - r^ = 0 (3.11) 
§- = pf^ - rz = 0 (3.12) 
and rearranging terms, the profit maximizing conditions are 
pf^ = r^ and pf^ = r^ . (3.13) 
The value of the marginal product of each input must equal that input's 
marginal unit cost. Because the profit maximizing combination of X^ and 
X2 lies on the firm's expansion path, the condition 
pfl 
# ' 4  
also holds at the optimum. Equation (3.14) states that the ratio of 
the marginal physical products of inputs X^ and Xg equals the ratio of 
the two inputs' unit costs. Geometrically, this equilibrium is 
represented by the tangency of the isoquant with the inputs' price line. 
If unit costs r^ and rg are assumed to include the costs of financing 
the acquisition of inputs X^ and X^, then the previous condition vill 
also hold in the case of coital scarcity, but only if the ratio of 
financing costs equals the ratio of input costs. 
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If the firm is assumed to be maximizing output subject to a budget 
constraint so that the objective function is 
V = f(X^, X^) + n(C° - r^X^ - r^X^ " b) (3.15) 
vfliere p is a Lagrangian constraint variable and the fixed budget, then 
the condition 
4 f- {ir^^ 
once again holds at the optimum. While the budget constraint could be 
construed as a money capital constraint, the manner in i&ich it is 
typically employed fails both to discriminate between the sources of 
money capital and to detect the differences in the money capital 
requirements of the different inputs. A more useful model of firm 
behavior under capital scarcity would make explicit the distinction 
between per-period unit input costs and money capital requirements per 
unit of input employed. 
Per-period unit input costs accrue per unit of input ençloyed in the 
time period under consideration. Hired labor costs, for example, can 
be expressed in dollars per man hour, fertilizer or feed costs in dollars 
per pound or gallon used during the accounting period. For rented 
inputs or owned capital inputs ençloyed over a number of accounting 
periods, the per-period unit input cost can be expressed as a rental fee 
or a periodic depreciation charge. Per-period input costs, in other 
words, are the costs that would appear as expenses for a particular time 
period on a firm's income statement. 
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Per-unit money capital requirements, on the other hand, refer to 
the cash investments required to ençloy particular inputs in production. 
Specific variable inputs such as hired labor and rented capital inputs 
may have no money capital requirements, while fixed inputs would almost 
certainly require a permanent investment of money capital. Money capital 
requirements can be identified as the acquisition costs of assets that 
appear on a firm's balance sheet. Thus, the total acquisition costs of 
long-term assets such as land and buildings and intermediate-term assets 
such as machinery, equipment and breeding livestock could be considered 
to constitute those assets' money capital requirements. These assets 
are acquired in one period to be used over the course of succeeding 
periods. 
Many short-term assets would also have money capital requirements 
due to the mismatch in the timing of revenue inflows and cost outflows 
during a given accounting period. Cash, receivables, inventories of 
inputs, goods-in-process, and finished goods are all held to satisfy 
liquidity requirements, production needs, or marketing strategies. 
These investmaits would, therefore, help determine the money capital 
requirements of short-term assets. Much of the value of these assets 
is financed by short-term liabilities such as accounts payable or short-
term notes due. To the extent that these short-term liabilities finance 
a given level of short-term assets, no permanent investment of money 
capital is required to maintain that level of assets. The excess of 
short-term assets over short-term liabilities, that is, working capital, 
represents the money capital requirement of short-term assets. It 
40 
represents the portion of those assets that is financed by long-term 
debt or equity. 
The term, money capital, does not refer to any specific form of 
asset, but instead refers to purchasing power. It, therefore, 
represents a constraint to the firm and not a productive asset such as 
land or labor. As money capital is transformed into physical assets 
through the purchase of capital assets or the maintenance of a certain 
level of working capital, it becomes productive. 
Given this distinction between per unit input costs and money 
capital requirements, it becomes apparent that a budget constraint and a 
money capital constraint may be completely different. A firm could find 
its capital constraint nonbinding because few fixed inputs are purchased 
or working capital requirements are low while being constrained by total 
operating expenditures. On the other hand, production of a given level 
of output could be feasible in the context of the operating budget, yet 
infeasible given the magnitude of fixed asset costs or working capital 
requirements. 
Recalling that the two sources of money capital are debt and equity, 
the latter arising from either the issuance of stock or the retention of 
earnings, then the constraint on money capital can be expressed as 
follows : 
K + D = g(Q) + + CgX^ (3.17) 
where K and D represent equity and debt, respectively, and g(Q) 
represents the working capital requirement which is assumed to depend on 
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the level of output. The parameters and Cg represent the money 
capital requirements that can be attributed to each input, and 
respectively. 
Optimization of the Model 
Adding the money capital availability constraint in Equation (3.17) 
to the profit equation defined in Equation (3.10) forms the Lagrangian 
function, 
L = f(X^, X^) - r^X^ - rgXg - b + \(K + D - g (Q) - Cj^X^ - c^xp. 
(3.18) 
Differentiating with respect to inputs X^ and Xg and setting the 
results equal to zero yields the first order conditions for a constrained 
maximum, 
= pf^ - - X(g'f^ + c^) = 0 and (3.19) 
= pfg - - XCg'fg + Cg) = 0 . (3.20) 
Rearranging Equations (3,19) and (3.20) yields 
pfj^ = r^ + X(g'fj^ + cp and (3.21) 
pfg = ^ 2 + • (3.22) 
Â further rearrangement yields 
(P - Xg') = r^ + X and (3.23) 
42 
fg (P - >.g') = r2 + X C2 . (3.24) 
The difference between these first order conditions and those derived 
from the usual, unconstrained, profit maximizing function arises from the 
presence of the money capital constraint. On the left-hand side of 
Equations (3.23) and (3.24), the value of the marginal product of inputs 
and Xg, respectively, must be reduced by the imputed marginal cost of 
the additional working capital necessitated by the employment of more of 
the inputs. On the rig^t-hand side, to the marginal factor cost of 
inputs X^ and X2, respectively, are added the imputed costs of acquiring 
the inputs. The imputed values on both sides of the equation vary with 
the degree of scarcity of money capital. If money capital were not 
scarce, the conditions vould be identical to those of the usual, 
unconstrained case. 
The intact of the money capital requirement on the level of 
ençloyment of particular inputs can be seen by, first, totally 
differentiating Equations (3.19) and (3.20). The total differentiation 
yields 
Pfll^^i + pfj^2"®2 + = dr^ + Xg' f^^dX^ 
+ X g*fi2^2 + + g'f^dX 
+ X dc^ + c^dX and (3,25) 
43 
Pfzi^ + 9^22^2 + ^2^P = dr2 + X g'f^j^dX^ 
+ X g'£22^X2 + X fgdg' + g'f2d X 
+ X dc2 + * 
Rearranging the total differentials in matrix form yields, 
^izCp - kg') 
^22(9 " &8') 
(3.26) 
fll(p - Xg') 
f2i(P - Xg') 
dX^ 
dX2 
-fj^dp + dr^ + XCf^dg' + dcj^) + (g'f^ + <y^)dX 
-f2dp + dr2 + X(f2dg* + ^02) + (g'fg + C2)dX 
Assuming that the Jacobian, 
jjj = (^^11^22 ' ^12 " Xg') 
is nonsingular and positive, then, by Cramer's rule. 
where 
(3.27) 
(3.28) 
(3.29) 
)jll = 222(9 " Xg')(-fj^dp + dr^ + X(fj^dg* + dcy^) + (g'f^ + c^)dX) 
-fl2(p - Xg*)(-f2<ip + <^^2 + X(f2d8' + dcg) + (g*f2 + C2)dX) . 
(3.30) 
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Differentiating with respect to c^ while holding all other variables 
and parameters constant gives 
d3L f (p - Xg')X 
3^  = -^Pl • 
As long as the Lagrangian constraint, X, is binding (X > 0) and as 
long as input X2 exhibits diminishing marginal productivity (.^22 
then 
dX^ 
^ < 0 , (3.32) 
«1 
meaning that an increase in the money capital requirement of a particular 
input reduces the level of ençloyment of that input 
Therefore, a shift in relative input use or a change in output 
can occur even in the absence of a change in unit input prices. Â 
change in the money capital requirement of an input is sufficient for 
this to occur. The equilibrium condition in the case of capital scarcity 
is 
^1 ^1 ^®l 
The introduction of the money capital requirements, the c^s, will result 
in a different conclusion than the case of no money capital requirements 
unless either X = 0, meaning that capital is not scarce, or the ratio of 
the money capital requirements equals the ratio of the per-period unit 
"^This result also requires that p - Xg' > 0, a condition lAich must 
exist if Equations (3.23) and (3.24) are to yield reasonable results. 
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input costs. 
It is also of interest to know the impact of easing the money 
capital constraint on both the value of the objective function and the 
optimal levels of input en^loyment. Recalling the form of the Lagrangian 
function. 
L = pf(X^, Xg) - - r^X^ - b + X(K + D - g(Q) - c^X^ - , 
the variable X measures the impact of the money capital constraint on 
the value of the objective function when that function is at its optimum 
where asterisks indicate that the variables are at their respective 
optima. An easing of the constraint can arise from either an addition 
of debt or equity capital or a dimunition of the money capital 
requirements. 
Assuming no change in the money capital requirements, expressing 
debt, D, as a fraction of total equity, K, so that 
(3.34) 
[Intriligator, 1971, p. 60]. Thus, 
\* = ÔL* (3.35) ô[K + D - g(Q) -
D = 6K (3.36) 
and defining total money capital available as 
K + ÔK = K(1 + 6) , (3.37) 
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then 
" ÔCK(1^+ 6)] (3.38) 
Thus, an increase in 5, \diich represents the ratio of debt to equity, can 
serve to ease the money capital constraint. The expression in 
Equation (3.38) can be interpreted as the change in value to the objective 
function of increasing the leverage ratio of the firm. 
With a fixed level of equity, selection of an accompanying level of 
debt is tantamount to selection of a leverage ratio. At the limit, the 
money capital constraint can become a limit on debt use. It remains to 
indicate the role of the down-payment (or alternatively, loan-to-value) 
ratio in the context of the money capital constraint. Assuming that the 
money capital constraint is binding, an increase (decrease) in the 
allowable loan-to-value ratio would serve to ease (tighten) the 
constraint. 
Application to Farm-Firm Analysis 
The money capital constraint to be used in this study will be 
modified in several respects from the more general form presented in 
Equation (3.17). First, it will ignore the working capital requirement. 
Inclusion of a working capital term in the constraint would not materially 
alter the results of the analysis. It would merely ti^ten the money 
capital constraint for any given level of input use. Second, the 
constraint will identify input Xg as the capital or stock input vdiich 
requires a money capital investment and as the current or flow input 
which does not. Thus, only input Xg will appear in the constraint. These 
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modifications are made in anticipation of the comparative statics 
analysis to be iindertaken below. They vill serve to simplify the analysis 
•without affecting the results. The money capital constraint, as modified, 
is specified as follows: 
K + D = X2 (3.39) 
where 
K = owner's equity fixed and given in this case; 
D = total debt of the firm; and 
Y2 Xg = the total money capital requirement for the capital or stock 
input, Xg) that must be met before production of optimal 
quantity can begin. This value is the product of the unit 
price of the capital input times the number of units purchased. 
It represents, in other words, the acquisition costs or 
investment required to own a given amount of X2. 
There is a stock-flow problem implied by the formulation of the 
model. The objective function regards the flow of services from an 
input during the production period and the ensuing cost of that flow. 
The constraint, on the other hand, concerns the cost of obtaining a stock 
of inputs and the availability of money capital to finance the ownership 
of that stock. Iftiile the problem does not arise in the case of input 
which is representative of a broadly defined group of flow or current 
inputs, it is present in the case of input X^ \Aiich is representative of 
a group of stock or capital inputs. This variable appears in both the 
objective function and the money capital constraint. The decision to be 
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made with regard to X2 is how much of the input to ençloy in production, 
but that decision must take into account the costs of maintaining the 
stock of that provides the optimal flow of input services during the 
production period. 
Consider 
X2 = sn input used over several production periods that embodies a 
flow of services (e.g., machine hours, shelter or storage 
years, acre years); 
= the acquisition cost or purchase price of one unit of input 
X2 (e.g., ($/machine hour) (machine hours/unit), ($/shelter 
year)(shelter year/unit), ($/acre year)(acre years/acre)); and 
k = the factor that converts the stock input into an annual flow. 
It can be regarded as the proportion of the services embodied 
in the stock input that are expended in a single production 
period. 
Â tractor or combine, for exançle, embodies n machine hours and its 
purchase price can be regarded as the product of n machine hours and the 
price per machine hour. The factor k can be considered to be an annual 
depreciation percentage for both the physical asset and its acquisition 
cost. 
An additional problem, however, arises in the case of land. Land 
is usually considered to be of infinite durability. The stock of 
services embodied in an acre of land is not expended in the manner of 
machinery or building services. On the other hand, land is valued in 
finite dollar terms usually on the basis of the following valuation 
49 
formula: 
V = I (3.40) 
where V represents the capitalized value of an acre of land, R, the 
current returns to the land (often proxied by the rental rate) and i, the 
decision maker's discount or capitalization rate. In the case of land, 
R would be a good approximation of the dollar value of services rendered 
during a production period. According to the valuation formula above, 
R = iV. Assuming that i and V are equivalent to p and respectively, 
then in the case of land, the factor k can be seen to equal p, the equity 
owner's capitalization rate. 
Conçarative Static Results 
Recalling the objective function in Equation (3.5) and the money 
capital constraint in Equation (3.39), the Lagrangian equation can be 
expressed as follows: 
L = C pQ - - k X2 - r D] + \Ck + D - X^]. 
(3.41) 
The decision variables in this model are and the Lagrangian 
constraint, The variable X^ represents the quantity of the flow input 
to be used in the period while the variable X^ represents the amount of 
the stock variable to be purchased, but not necessarily used, during the 
period under consideration. The total amount of debt employed by the 
decision maker is assumed to depend on policies of lenders. Thus, a 
leverage ratio is imposed on the decision maker. 'While this arrangement 
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bars the simultaneous determination of optimal input demand and optimal 
debt level, it does allow input choice to be influenced by the 
availability of money capital and to vary even in the absence of a 
change in input costs. 
Differentiating the Lagrangian equation with respect to the decision 
variables and setting the results equal to zero yields the following 
first order conditions. 
= p ^1 - V = (^-42) 
1^ = ^  [P fg - k Yg] - X Y2 = 0» and (3.43) 
^ = K  +  D  •  ( 3 . 4 4 )  
These equations represent the first order conditions for a 
constrained maximum. They can be solved for the optimal level of input 
use given exogenously determined debt and equity levels. 
Equation (3.42) above can be rewritten as 
i P £1 . i (3.45) 
The capitalized (or present) value of the marginal value product of 
input must, at the optimal employment level, equal the capitalized 
value of the marginal factor cost of This result does not differ 
from the standard neoclassical result except insofar as it deals with 
capitalized values. But even then, changes in the capitalization rate 
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would have no impact because both sides of the equation are equally 
affected. 
Equation (3.43) above can be restated as follows; 
ipfj-XVj.ikYj . <3.46) 
If k = p, then 
i p - Wj . Yj (3.47) 
which means that, at equilibrium, the present value of the marginal 
value product of minus the imputed value of the money capital 
investment in X2 equals the acquisition price of Two things to note 
are first, that the marginal value product of the returns to the 
stock input, must be capitalized if they are to be compared to the 
acquisition price, and second, that the significance of the money 
capital investment depends directly on the severity of the money capital 
constraint. If money capital is not scarce, X would equal zero. 
The more binding the money capital constraint becomes, the larger 
the value of X becomes and the larger must be the return to the factor 
to justify its acquisition at a given price. On the other hand, a 
easing of the constraint reduces the value of X and lowers the 
opportunity cost of the investment of money capital in a particular 
asset. In terms of the first order condition for input X2, an increase 
(decrease) in the value of X, all other values held constant, 
decreases (increases) the value of the left-hand side of the equation, 
calling for a like change on the right-hand side in order to maintain 
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equilibrium. 
In examining the particular case of land purchase decisions, if 
the price of land rises, the money capital constraint may become 
binding. Assuming a fixed equity base, a situation of particular 
relevance to beginning farmers who own little or no land, the amount of 
debt in the financial structure may become the limiting factor in 
attaining optimal size. The amount of debt required for the acquisition 
of higher priced land may be infeasible for one of two reasons. The 
decision maker may be faced with an internal constraint on the financial 
leverage he is willing to maintain or, as in the present model, he may 
be constrained by the amount that lenders are willing to lend. 
Recall the first order conditions for a maximum, 
% = ; - V - "• 
= p [p^2 - - X ^2 = 0. and (3.49) 
1^  = K + D - YGXG « 0 . (3.50) 
To determine whether these equations are, in fact, the first order 
conditions for a constrained maximum, the second order condition must 
be checked. Totally differentiating Equations (3.48), (3.49), and 
(3.50), respectively, and rearranging by grouping terms, 
p +f fi2«2 - 7 - r 
(3.51) 
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p ^21^1 + p ^22^2 - = (p + ^ ^ 
+ -ô (p f« - k'Y,)clD, and 
- Y2^2 " ^2^'Y2 -
(3.52) 
(3.53) 
In matrix form. 
p ^11 P ^12 0 dXi 
P ^21 p ^22 -^2 
• 
dX2 = (3.54) 
0 
-^2 0 _dX 
^1 , t 
- — dp + ^  
P 
(P -
k Y? (% + X)dv + -^ dk 
P ^ P 
2 , t 
- — dp + -^ 
P 
(P ^2 - kY2)dD 
V^2 - dK - dD 
The second order condition for a constrained maximum, that the 
bordered Hessian matrix be negative definite, is met if the production 
function is assumed to have the normal properties (i.e. diminishing 
marginal physical productivity). Thus, 
IHJ- - ^  (P VII) > 0 (3.55) 
if fj^^ < 0. 
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The optimal values of the endogenous variables, X^, X2 and X can 
be expressed as functions of the exogenous variables such that 
II < (1- p ' kY2 P ' D, K), (3.56) 
* 
^2 = < ^1 p ' 
kY2 
P ' 
D, K) , and (3.57) 
X* = X* ^1 0 » 
kY2 
-T' D, K) . (3.58) 
Thus, the optimal values of the endogenous variables will be influenced 
by changes in the levels of the exogenous variables. 
To investigate the impact of changes in the exogenous variables, 
including the availability of debt financing, on the demand for inputs, 
we can employ the system of total differentials shown in Equations (3.51) 
through (3.53). The impact of a change in debt availability on the 
demand for inputs can be seen by dividing this system by dD while 
assuming that all other exogenous variables remain unchanged. Writing 
the results in matrix form. 
2f If 
p ""ii p ^12 
P ^21 
2 f 
p 22 
-V„ 
-"Yo 
dX, 
t 
dD 7 1 • p 
dX2 t 
dD ^ CP £2 -
dD •JL 
(3.59) 
Given that the bordered Hessian matrix, |H| is identical to the 
Jacobian matrix, jj], by Cramer's rule. 
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dD |j| 
% (P fi - vp 
\ (P ^ 2 " ^"^2^ 
P 
-1 
P ^12 
1 f 
p ^22 -Yo 
-Y2 0 
, or (3.60) 
^2 (P - \> + f Vl2> (3.61) 
The first order conditions for a maximum require that p f^, the 
value of the marginal physical product of X^, be equal to "Y^, the unit 
dXi 
price of If those conditions hold, then is positive which means 
that an increase in debt availability will increase the demand for 
input X^. 
Also, by Cramer's rule. 
dX, 
dD^ 
2 1 
|J| 
P ^11 
P ^21 
dX„ 
& (P 
t , , (p kY_) -Y, 
^"13T 
p ^ii'^a. ) > 0 
, and (3.62) 
J 
(3.63) 
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The increased availability of debt will lead to an increase in the 
demand for the stock or capital input in the present model. 
The final comparative static result involving a ceteris paribus 
change in the availability of debt financing, 
f or (3.64) 
# = 177^^2 p (^11 & - ^^2) - ^21 % (P ^1 - \)) 
HI P P 
2 
^ J 2 11 22 12^" 
P 
- (2- (f _ f:.))} , (3.65) 
will be negative assuming that the first order conditions for a 
maximum hold. This result is logical in that the greater availability 
of debt eases the constraint and lowers the shadow price of debt. 
These results derive from the fact that the level of ençloyment of 
Xg, because of the model specification, is dependent on the 
availability of money capital. As money capital becomes more freely 
available, the utilization of input Xg rises. It is assumed that the 
cross-partial of input X^ with respect to a change in input X2 is 
positive, Tneaning that an increase in the use of Xg, ceteris paribus, 
raises the marginal value product of input X^, Therefore, an increase 
in the utilization of Xg results in a rise in the employment of X^. 
The model also demonstrates that other exogenous variables affect 
input demand as well, as shown in Table 3.1 below. For example, a 
change in the expected price of output, p, has a positive impact on the 
Table 3.1, Summary of comparative static results 
Endog. var. 
Exog. var. 
P 17[ ^2") pf > 0 11 
1 P ^2 
( — (^21^1 " ^ 11^2)) "RT ' p 
1 
pv. 
^1^21 (f, - -r) > 0 
ni 
W <T' ° p i < 0 11 •jjf (f-^) < 0 
21 
pV,f < 0 2"11 
^12*2 
^11*^2 
< 0 
T^<^> 
=  - i < 0  
1 p Xn 0 
^^11^22"^12 ) 
1 ^2^^11^22'^12 
Y2 pf. 
+ (f+x)} Jo 
11 
2 
tYo 
(P fi - Y^)} 
{ "  
PP fil 
(P fi - Yi) 
K 
W 
12 
^11^2 
> 0 
P M Ijf ^"T (fii<p fr^Yg) 
- ^21 (p ^ 1 - Yi)) 
- P (^11^22 " ^ 12 ^ 
~ 2  ( f i i ( P  
pVu 
- f„ (p f, - Y,)) 
(^11^09 " ^ 10 ) U1 00 
< 0 
_L ^11^2. 1 ) = ^ > 0 TjT (^11^22 - ^12^>> 
' ' P 
P^11^2 
2 (^11^22 ' ^12 ) 
< 0 
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demand for input and on the value of the Lagrangian multiplier, X. 
An increase in the price of output raises the value of the marginal 
product of X^, and requires a greater employment of X^ for the 
maintenance of equilibrium. An increase in the price of output likewise 
makes any scarcity of money capital that much more costly in terms of 
lost profit opportunities. 
The impact of a change in the expected price of output on the 
employment of Xg is shown to be zero. While this result may at first 
seem untenable, it must be remembered that the comparative static analysis 
deals with the values of the endogenous variables derived within the 
context of constrained maximization. Thus, the level of employment of 
input Xg is contingent on the availability of money capital. The desired 
level of employment of Xg may indeed be positively related to changes in 
the price of output, but the optimal level is still a function of the 
constraint. The value of the Lagrangian multiplier, already shown to 
be positively related to changes in the price of output, may provide 
a clue as to the relationship between the desired level of employment 
of input X2 and the price of output. This multiplier can be 
interpreted as the value to the objective function of easing the money 
capital constraint. Because an easing of the constraint would allow a 
greater employment of input Xg, then the Lagrangian multiplier m^ 
also be interpreted as the value to the objective function of an 
increase in the number of units of Xg ençloyed. Because the change in \ 
with respect to a change in the price of output is positive, it can be 
implied that changes in the desired level of employment of Xg are also 
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positively related to changes in output price. 
The impact of a change in the price of input on the demand for 
is negative. The rise in the price of requires a commensurate 
rise in its marginal value product to maintain equilibrium. Given an 
unchanging output price and diminishing marginal productivity of inputs, 
the only way to achieve the required increase is to cut back on the 
employment of Similarly, the impact of a change in the unit price 
of X^ on the Lagrangian multiplier is negative. The decrease in the 
level of X^ employment brought about by the rise in its unit price vould 
lead to a reduction in the employment of X2. The relationship between 
the two inputs in production is suc^ that changes in the usage of X^ 
also affect the marginal physical productivity of input X^. This 
relationship is positive (i.e. ^ 0) so that a reduction in X^ 
employment leads to a decrease in the marginal physical product of Xg 
and a subsequent decrease in X2 enq>loyment. Thus, any constraint on 
the employment of Xg is rendered less costly in terms of forgone profit. 
The direct inçact of a change in the unit price of X^ on the employment 
of input X2 is zero. The employment of Xg is, as argued previously, 
contingent on the money capital constraint and the price of input X^ 
is not present in that constraint. 
A change in Y2J the unit price of input Xg, has a negative impact 
on the demand for both X^ and X2. The unit price of X2 is defined as 
the acquisition price of a capital asset, ka. increase in Yg vould, 
ceteris paribus, reduce the level of employment of both Xg and X^. 
The reduction in the utilization of Xg comes about because such a 
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reduction, wLth its positive impact on productivity, offers the only vay 
to maintain equilibrium in the face of a rise in The ençloyment of 
falls to compensate for the drop in productivity visited upon input 
by a decrease in the employment of X^. The impact of a change in the 
price of Xg on the value of the Lagrangian constraint is cosçlicated by 
the fact that two opposing effects are operating simultaneously. As 
the price of X^ rises, less of the input will be utilized, thus 
decreasing the value of scarce money capital and of the Lagrangian 
multiplier. On the other hand, a rise in the price of Xg makes the 
constraint more severe for any given level of X2 used in production. 
The net intact will depend on the relative strengths of the two 
opposing effects. 
The impact on the endogenous variables of a change in the amount of 
available debt financing has already been described in some detail. Â 
change in the amount of equity capital available will have positive 
impacts on the demands for X^ and Xg, respectively, and a negative 
impact on the value of the Lagrangian multiplier. Ceteris paribus, an 
increase in the availability of equity will raise the utilization of 
input X2. This occurrence will lead to an increase in the desired 
level of employment of input X^. An increase in equity will, of course, 
lessen the opportunity cost of money capital because that opportunity 
cost is inversely related to the availability of money capital. 
Implications for Land Prices 
These comparative static results suggest the impact of greater 
debt availability on the demand for inputs by an individual 
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decision maker. The market demand function for an input is obtained 
by summing the demand functions of the individual decision makers. 
Given a more general model specification, the greater availability of 
debt through a higher loan-to-value ratio would be expected to have a 
differential impact on decision makers. Some would have no capital 
constraint to begin with while others may already have been operating 
at a self-imposed debt limit. The remainder, however, would expand 
their demand for inputs as their source of money capital grew. With 
the present model specification, all decision makers are assumed to 
respond positively to changes in the availability of debt. Thus, the 
input demand curves for each individual as well as the aggregate demand 
curve would shift rightward with an increase in the availability of 
debt. 
Up to this point, the discussion has centered around the 
relationship between input demand and debt availability given the 
prices of those inputs. The focus of the empirical model, however, 
will be the explanation of variability in the price of one input, 
namely, farm land. 
The qualitative demand functions derived earlier suggest the 
relationship between the demand for an input and the price of that 
input. Holding constant all of the other variables that have been 
shown to affect the demand for an input, the relationship between input 
demand and input price is reflected in the locus of points that 
constitutes that input's demand curve. At asy selected input price, 
the demand curve shows the level of input use that, ceteris paribus. 
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maximizes the objective function. Similarly, at any selected input 
level, the demand curve shows the maximum price per unit that the 
decision maker would be willing to pay. 
If the demand functions for and are inverted to solve for 
price rather than quantity demanded, the quantities of and Xg 
rather than their prices are regarded as being exogenously determined. 
The demand curves for X^ or X2 are not altered in any way, either in 
slope or location. But, instead of assuming that the decision maker 
adjusts the quantity he purchases to a given price, the inverse demand 
function assumes that the buyer adjusts his bid price for a given 
quantity offered for sale so as to achieve a point on his demand curve. 
Thus, if 
* Y, 
\ = \ (^) (3.66) 
and 
then 
and 
* kYg 
^2 ^  ^2 » (3.67) 
* 
Y. * 
^ = gi(Xi) (3.68) 
kYg * 
— = 82(^2) . (3.69) 
Again, assuming that k = p, then 
•Y* = g2(X*) . (3.70) 
The conçarative statistics results presented in Table 3.1 above 
reflected the case where quantities of inputs and X2 were the 
endogenous variable and their prices, the exogenous variables. Because 
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most of the comparative static results involve a shift in the demand 
curve, specifying the price of either input as endogenous and the 
quantity as exogenous makes no difference. For example, the impact of 
a change in the price of output on the employment of as shown in 
Table 3.1, is positive. This result arises from a shift in the demand 
curve for (i.e. increase in the price of output increases the value 
of the input's marginal product at every level of marginal physical 
product). The assumption that X^, rather than is exogenous changes 
nothing in the relationship between changes in the price of output and 
movement of the demand curve. Thus, the intact of a change in output 
dYi 
price on the price of X^, is also positive. The same logic applies 
to the other exogenous variables in the model. Where the impact of a 
change in any other variable on the demand for is positive (negative), 
that impact is likewise positive (negative) on the change in the price 
of X^. This is, of course, true of Xg as well. 
The comparative static result that reflects movement a.long the 
dX^ dXg 
demand curves for Xj^ or X2, that is, and remain negative with 
» 12 
the reversal of the roles of price and quantity. This result must be 
true since the demand curves for both inputs are downward sloping 
regardless of whether price or quantity is exogenous. When quantity is 
exogenous and when, ceteris paribus, it changes, the decision maker 
must adjust his bid price to remain on his demand curve. If a larger 
quantity is offered for sale it can only be employed by the decision 
maker at a lower unit price since he will encounter diminishing marginal 
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returns in using the additional quantity in production. 
The comparative static results, however, have not considered the 
role of the supply of the input in determining the ultimate change in 
the endogenous variables. If the supply of the input «ere perfectly 
elastic, the full inçact of a rightward shift in the demand curve would 
be on quantity. On the other hand, a perfectly inelastic supply curve 
•would yield a new equilibrium at the same quantity, but at a higher 
price. A positively sloped, but not perfectly inelastic, supply curve 
would produce a new equilibrium that reflected increases in both price 
and quantity sold. 
If input refers to owned farm land, the conditions under which 
it is supplied are probably best approximated by an upward sloping 
supply curve. Althou^ the absolute amount of land that is available 
for use at any point in time is fixed, the amount that is available for 
sale will vary with the price offered. Thus, one would expect the new 
equilibrium resulting from a ri^tward shift in demand to reflect both 
an increased quantity and a hi^er price. In other words, an increase 
in demand for land brought about by an increase in the availability of 
debt would theoretically lead to the purchase of additional land, but 
at a higher price. 
Summary 
Chapter III has presented a model of firm behavior under the 
condition of money capital scarcity. The objective function in this 
model maximizes the discounted value of profits accruing to the 
owners of the firm. The discount factor reflects the owner's attitude 
66 
toward risk, risk in this case being represented by the variance in 
returns to the owner. The variance in returns and the discount rate 
have been shown to be a function of the proportion of debt in the 
firm's financial structure. As the proportion of debt to equity 
increases, ceteris paribus, so does the variance in expected returns to 
the owner. 
The objective function is constrained by the availability of money 
capital which is defined as the purchasing power necessary to acquire 
capital assets and maintain a given level of working capital. The 
constraint on money capital availability is an important concern to the 
decision maker in that it has an inçact on the size of the firm and 
on the selection of capital inputs employed by the firm. If money 
capital becomes more freely available to a firm through an increase in 
equity funding or through an increase in debt financing, there is likely 
to be a change in the demand for productive inputs. This change of 
demand for inputs is likely, in turn, to influence the price of inputs. 
The model presented in this chapter, thus, makes explicit the link 
between production decisions and financial decisions. It remains for 
the empirical model which will be presented in Chapter V to test the 
relationship between money capital availability and the demand for and 
price paid for agricultural land. Both the direction and strength of 
this relationship have been suggested by the comparative static analysis 
of the model and the results of earlier research reviewed in Chapter II. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE DATA SET 
The model presented in Chapter III has demonstrated a theoretical 
basis for the relationship between down-payment terms and the price of 
agricultural land. It is the purpose of this chapter to identify the 
data needed to test specific hypotheses about that relationship. 
The most obvious data requirements are observations on sale prices 
for farm land transactions and the corresponding down payments made as 
a part of those transactions. Selling price and down-payment percentage 
represent, respectively, the dependent and independent variables in the 
relationship between land price and debt availability conjectured by 
the model in Chapter III. 
However, as the theoretical model dictates, and as common sense 
would suggest, the down-payment percentage is not the only variable to 
influence the sale price of farm land. An array of other variables 
has been shown, in the context of the theoretical model, to have an 
impact on the sale price. Thus, the data requirements must be expanded 
to include those variables as well. As an exanple, while the purpose 
of this study is not to examine the intact of the price of agricultural 
output on the prices paid for farm land, some measure of the price of 
agricultural output has been shown logically to belong to the set of 
variables that affect the demand for farm land and must therefore be 
included. Other variables, likewise shown by economic theory to be 
important, may have additional uses. The impact of the down-payment 
requirement on sale price may vary with changes in the values of other 
pertinent variables. For example, the theoretical model implies that 
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the initial equity position of a decision maker may have an intact on 
his or her demand for capital inputs. Data vhich describe the equity 
position of the buyer of farm land would thus be required if a 
hypothesis regarding the affect of initial equity position were to be 
tested. 
A further requirement regards the type of data to be used. As 
discussed in the critique of existing literature, most land valuation 
studies are conducted using aggregate data. That data prevent the 
examination of the impact of certain key variables. Aggregation of 
data tends to eliminate much of the variation in both the dependent and 
independent variables making it difficult to detect hypothesized 
relationships. Often, the most convening explanatory variable in 
aggregated data is a trend which arises from a source outside the 
variables of interest. %hile trends are important in their own rigjht, 
they tend to obscure the true relationship between dependent and 
independent variables. The type of data needed for examining the 
problems of interest to this study is micro data. One available set of 
micro data consists of 182 observations of farm real estate sales 
made in the state of Iowa over the years 1969 through 1979. These data 
were collected during the period 1977-1979 as part of a class 
assignment for an undergraduate course in farm appraisal taught at 
Iowa State University. 
Although the observations span the 11 years from 1969 through 
1979, they are concentrated in a fewer number of years, as shown in 
Table 4.1 below. The four years, 1976 through 1979, account for nearly 
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Table 4.1. Distribution of sale observations by type of financing and 
by year of sale 
Year 
Number of observations 
Total 
Type of financing 
Cash Contract Mortgage 
1969 1 1 — — -
1970 1 - - - - 1 
1971 1 - - — - 1 
1972 2 1 1 --
1973 4 - - 3 1 
1974 8 2 2 4 
1975 12 4 4 4 
1976 24 3 9 12 
1977 42 9 19 14 
1978 51 13 20 18 
1979 32 6 12 14 
85 percent of the observations. 
Even though the observations are representative of sales in the 
Iowa farm land market over a number of years, they can also be 
considered cross-sectional in that they are representative of sales 
across location and quality of land and type of buyer. Since the 
primary focus of this study is on the cross-sectional dimension, the 
data are treated as such, the "point in time" being stretched beyond 
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a single calendar year. To counter the affects of a rising price 
level over the time period, all prices are deflated by the implicit 
GNP price deflator. The potential for structural change is mitigated 
by the relatively short length of the time series. 
Basic information recorded for each sale includes date of sale, 
price paid, the names of buyer and seller, the number of acres in the 
sale tract, and the location of the tract (see Appendix A for a copy 
of the survey form). Data on financing terms collected for each sale 
include the type of financing, whether contract or mortgage; the dollar 
amount of down payment; the interest rate on the contract or mortgage; 
the term of the loan, and the payment pattern, tAiether periodic or 
balloon, or a combination of the two. Land contracts financed 38 
percent of all sample sales over all years, although the proportion 
varied, excluding the years before 1975, from 33 percent in 1973 to 
45 percent in 1977. Some 39 percent of all sales in all years were 
mortgage-financed. This percentage ranged, again excluding 1969 through 
1974, from a low of 33 percent in 1975 and 1977 to a high of 50 percent 
in 1976. The amount of down payment as a percentage of purchase price 
averaged 15.8 percent for all years and both types of financing. 
Table 4.2 presents a detailed breakdown by year and type of financing. 
The average interest rate and term of loan were 7.68 percent and 14.2 
years, respectively, for contract sales and 8.84 percent and 28.1 years, 
respectively, for mortgage sales. 
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Table 4.2. Average down-payment percentage by type of financing and 
year of sale, cash sales excluded 
Type of financing 
Year Contract Mortgage 
1969 —7. —% 
1970 — —  — —  
1971 —  - — —  
1972 3 - -
1973 20 
1974 20 35 
1975 17 19 
1976 14 15 
1977 20 26 
1978 18 27 
1979 17 22 
The data set also includes tvo important groups of variables 
describing, respectively, the characteristics of the faann sold and the 
characteristics of the buyer. The farm is described in terms of its 
location, its productivity, and the buildings and improvements on the 
property. More specifically, location includes the distance, in miles, 
of the tract from the nearest supply or marketing center, and the 
surface of the road accessing the tract. The farm's productivity is 
characterized by the number of tillable acres, acres in permanent 
pasture and vaste acres, the total farm average com suitability 
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rating (CSR), the average CSR for the tillable acres and the average 
com yield, both for total and for tillable acres. Buildings are 
characterized by their condition (e.g. from obsolete to excellent) 
•while improvements refer to the existence of terraces or tilling. Any 
specialized facilities such as livestock confinement facilities or 
Harvestore silos are also noted. 
Buyers are characterized with respect to form of ownership, 
owner-operator versus landlord; and type of ownership organization, 
single proprietorship, partnership, or corporation. The size of the 
buyer's operation before the land acquisition is reflected in the 
number of acres owned and rented prior to the current purchase; the 
number, horsepower, and age of tractors owned; and the number and age of 
self-propelled combines owned. 
The distance from the home farm to the new acquisition is also 
indicated, as well as a number of personal characteristics of the buyer. 
These include the number of years the owner-operator has been farming, 
the amount of off-farm income earned by the owner-operator and his 
family, and the total net worth of the owner-operator and family. For 
the latter variables, the buyer indicated the range in which his 
income and net worth, respectively, fell. 
Other data, necessary for the econometric model, are not found on 
the survey forms, but are available from other sources. Com prices by 
year and by price reporting district in Iowa are obtained from state 
extension service publications. The annual Iowa Land Value Survey, 
giving a county breakdown of farm land values, provides data for 
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estimating expected capital gains to farm land and the wealth of land 
buyers in the sample. 
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CHAPTER V. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct an econometric model 
capable of testing certain hypotheses about the inçact of the down-
payment percentage on the price paid for agricultural land. The issues 
of primary inçortance are first, what form the model should take and 
second, what variables should be included in the model. Economic theory, 
expecially in the form of the theoretical model presented in Chapter III 
above, provides the initial guidance in these matters. Data 
availability and the limitation of econometric techniques place further 
restrictions on the selection process. Finally, the statistical results 
of the estimation will help determine lAiether the model can be deemed an 
accurate reflection of the underlying relationship between the down-
payment percentage and the price paid for farm land. 
The chapter will proceed with a restatement of the general 
hypothesis of this study. The next section will describe the form of 
the econometric model and the variables to be included in the estimation 
of the regression parameters. Following that discussion will be the 
presentation of the parameter estimates and tests of their statistical 
significance. The chapter will conclude with the calculation of 
elasticity coefficients and their interpretation. 
The General Hypothesis : A Restatement 
Chapter III explained how and why the existence of a money capital 
constraint can affect the demand for a productive asset. Honey capital 
scarcity imposes an additional cost, albeit an opportunity cost, on the 
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acquisition of a productive asset. Recalling Equation (3.47) from 
Chapter III, 
i p f2 - X Y2 = Y2 (5.1) 
the element \Y2 on the left-hand side represents this additional cost. 
As long as X is positive, then money capital is scarce. As X varies, 
ceteris paribus, the equilibrium condition for input demand also changes. 
A comparison of the equilibrium level of use of an input that 
requires an investment in money capital with one that does not would 
show that the optimal solution requires the return to the former to 
"cover the cost" of the requisite investment in scarce money capital. 
The extent of this cost would depend on the degree of money capital 
scarcity. The more (less) severe the scarcity, the greater (lesser) the 
cost. Assuming the price of capital inputs to be unchanging, the 
severity of the constraint for a particular level of capital input use 
would depend on the availability of money capital in the form of debt or 
equity capital. In other words, the severity of the constraint would be 
reflected in the firm's leverage ratio, a low ratio reflecting a more 
severe constraint and a high ratio, a less severe constraint. 
The total money capital requirement for the acquisition of farm land 
is the product of the price per acre and the number of acres acquired. 
The sources of money capital available to the land buyer include his 
own equity and the debt financing extended by the mortgage lender or the 
land seller. Assuming that the land buyer has fixed equity capital, 
the total amount of money capital he or she has available for land 
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purchase is determined by the amount he can borrow which in turn is 
reflected in the size of the down payment he must make. 
Therefore, the greater (lesser) availability of money capital 
through smaller (larger) required down payment can be expected, under 
certain conditions, to have an impact on the demand for farm land. 
These conditions are, first, that money capital in general be scarce 
and second, that an individual not be constrained internally from adding 
debt to his financial structure. The impact on the demand for farm land 
will, depending on the conditions of supply, have an intact on the price 
of farm land. 
The nature and intensity of this inçact might be expected to vary 
across buyers with changes in otiher factors. The factor of particular 
interest to this study is the net wealth or equity of the land buyer at 
the time he makes the farm land purchase. 
Ceteris paribus, the buyer with the highest equity would be tie 
least levered, have the smallest discount rate, p, and again, as seen in 
Equation (5.1), attain equilibrium at a higher input price, 
1 p fg = 7% (1 + X) (5.2) 
If, instead of varying leverage ratios and discount rates, all 
buyers are assumed to have the same ratio and rate but different amounts 
of equity, then ceteris paribus, those with the highest level of equity 
will have the greatest total assets. And, if over the range of farm 
size normally encountered, size as measured by total assets is 
positively related to productivity, f^, then buyers with the largest 
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equity and greatest size still can attain equilibrium, according to 
Equation (5.2), at a higher input price, Thus, the direct impact of 
wealth on the demand for land is hypothesized to be positive. The 
direct impact of wealth on the price of farm land is likewise hypothesized 
to be positive, the buyer with the greater wealth having the greater 
bidding potential in the market for farm land [Harris and Nehring, 1976]. 
Even if large scale offers no advantages in terms of productivity, 
the level of wealth, as measured by equity level can influence the 
value of the Lagrangian constraint, X, and in the context of Equation 
(5.2) affect the demand for a productive asset. At higher levels of 
equity, ceteris paribus. the value of X would be smaller and the 
equality expressed in Equation (5.2) would be achieved at a higher price 
for input Xg-
We cannot test these hypotheses about the behavior of the buyers 
directly. That is, we have no way of knowing the nature and degree of 
substitution between down-payment percentage and price for an individual 
buyer in our sample. What we do have is a series of sale prices and 
accompanying information on the terms of sale and the characteristics 
of the buyer. Me assiune that these sales are made under competitive 
conditions which would imply that the highest bidder gets the land, if 
we can hold constant certain characteristics of the land, the buyer, and 
the terms of financing, then we can look for a relationship between sale 
price and down-payment percentage. 
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Model Formulation 
The proposed econometric model will take the form of a multiple 
regression model. The objective function and constraint, as shown in 
Chapter III, can be transformed through total differentiation into a 
system of equations in which each equation is linear with respect to the 
coefficients that are to be estimated. Linear regression, thus, is a 
suitable analytical technique. 
The variables denoted by the theoretical model as having a causal 
relationship to the price paid for agricultural land can be grouped into 
three categories. There are, first, those variables that determine the 
expected net revenues to be gained from the purchase of farm land. 
Second, there are the variables that reflect the financial structure of 
the decision maker's business at the time the purchase was made and 
third, there are the variables that describe the terms under which the 
land purchase was financed. There are, as well, some interactions 
between these categories. The problem then is to select from the data 
at hand the proper or best expression of these variables for inclusion 
in the multiple regression model. 
Expected net revenue 
The variables in the first category, expected net revenue, include 
the expected price of agricultural output, the expected relative 
productivity of land and the expected cost of the land input. 
As a measure of the expected price of agricultural output, the 
model will use the expected price of corn per bushel in the six price 
reporting districts in the state of Iowa. Because an expected value is 
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not observable, it will be necessary to create such a variable. The 
expected price of com can be deemed a forecasted price. Thus, the 
expected price of com vill be derived from a simple forecasting model. 
In selecting a forecasting method for this variable, the purpose is not 
to strive for accuracy per se, but to attempt to replicate the behavior 
of the farm land buyer in the sample data. The criterion for a good 
forecast in this case is the goodness-of-fit achieved by the variable in 
the regression equation. With this criterion in mind, the com price vas 
forecasted using a sinçle five year moving average. While the average 
com price in Iowa in dollars per bushel was available for all years, a 
breakdown by price reporting district was available only for the time 
period September 1974 through August 1978. To extend the district 
breakdown back the required number of years, a ratio of the district 
average to the state-wide average was calculated for each price reporting 
district for each year the data was available. These yearly ratios were 
averaged and that average was applied to the time period before 
September 1974 to find the average com price in each of the price 
reporting districts. It should be noted that the intrastate differences 
in com price reflect varying local supply and demand conditions as well 
as distance and accessibility to regional and national markets. While 
some of the factors that cause these differences vary from year to year, 
others, such as distance to major markets, location of processing plants 
or livestock production areas, and availability of rail and barge 
transportation change only gradually. Thus, the use of the calculated 
ratio to extend the district price series back several years was 
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considered an acceptable technique. Once the district prices were 
estimated for years prior to 1974, a price forecast, which represents 
the expected price, was calculated using a five year moving average for 
each year in the sample and for each price reporting district. The 
results are shown in Table 5.1. 
In the comparative static analysis of Chapter III, the relative 
productivity of the input did not emerge as an exogenous variable because 
it is assumed that the units of input are of identical quality. In 
reality, however, parcels of farm land are normally quite variable as 
to quality. Thus, in order to maintain the assumption of the theoretical 
model, a measure of productivity must be introduced. This measure helps 
to establish the ceteris paribus conditions necessary for assessing the 
relationship between the sale price of farm land and the variables of 
special interest to this study. 
Several measures of the productivity of the sample tracts are 
available. The proportion of tillable to total acres is known as are the 
average com suitability rating and the average com yield in bushels 
per acre for total acres and tillable acres, respectively. The best 
candidate for a measure of productivity would appear to be the average 
com yield per acre for all acres in the tract. Yield is a better 
reflection of actual productivity than the suitability rating \diich 
expresses potential productivity in light of assimed climatic conditions. 
Yield on total acres will be used instead of yield on tillable acres 
because the per-acre sale price, which serves as the dependent variable 
in the multiple regression, is itself an "average" price for all acres 
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Table 5.1. Five-year moving average com price in Iowa, by price 
reporting district, and five-year period 
Five-year Price reporting district 
period 
North- North North- South- South South-
vest central east vest central east 
1964-68 $1.08 $1.09 $1.10 $1.08 $1.10 $1.13 
1965-69 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.08 1.10 1.13 
1966-70 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.12 
1967-71 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.12 1.13 1.16 
1968-72 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.10 1.13 
1969-73 1.18 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.19 1.23 
1970-74 1.46 1.47 1.47 1.46 1.47 1.52 
1971-75 1.83 1.84 1.85 1.82 1.84 1.89 
1972-76 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.06 2.08 2.14 
1973-77 2.32 2.31 2.32 2.28 2.30 2.37 
1974-78 2.40 2.40 2.41 2.37 2.40 2.46 
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in the tract. 
Given the expected price of com per bushel and the expected yield 
in bushels per acre, the variable, expected gross returns per acre can 
be calculated as the product of price and yield. The expected sign of 
the variable in the multiple regression analysis is positive, the 
greater the expected gross return, the greater the sale price per acre. 
%hile this expression for gross returns per acre is valid for the 
period immediately following the acquisition of the land, it does not 
capture expectations regarding future periods. That is, while the 
gross return variable may be a good measure of current returns it does 
not measure expected future changes in those returns. What is needed 
is a variable that describes the expected growth rate in real gross 
returns. Real gross returns to farm land can vary with a change in the 
productivity of farm land or a change in the price of output. A good 
description of the change in these returns might be provided by a data 
series on average per acre cash rents for farm land. Such a series is 
not readily available for several reasons, one of \Aiich is the wide­
spread use of crop-share leases rather than cash leases in the rental of 
farm land in Iowa. A data series that is available, however, is the 
average value per acre of Iowa farm land and buildings, by crop 
reporting district. The land values appearing in these data series are 
based on a survey of real estate brokers. Land value is related to land 
rent through the standard valuation formula ^ ere 
V = f . (5.3) 
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If rent can be equated to net returns, R, then land value, V, can be 
seen as a function of rent and the discount rate, i. Changes in the 
returns to farm land should be reflected in both the per acre cash 
rents paid for land and in the per acre selling price of farm land. The 
variable of interest to this research, the expected rate of change in 
the returns to farm land, can thus be viewed as a function of past rates 
of change in the value of farm land. More specifically, the expected 
rate of change in returns to farm land for any given year is calculated 
as the average annual percentage change in the real value of farm land 
for the previous five years. The real value of farm land was derived by 
deflating the nominal land value data series by the in^licit GNP price 
deflator published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 1972 = 100. This 
variable is essentially a measure of real capital gains to farm land. 
The impact of capital gains on land values has been examined by 
Crowley [1974] and Plaxico and Kletke [1979]. These authors modify the 
traditional land valuation formula to include expected capital gains as 
a return to ownership. Expectations of capital gains would thus raise 
the value of farm land. The question as to how capital gains arise and 
why they achieve the magnitudes they do has been studied by 
Melichar [1979] and Reinsel and Reinsel [1979] among others. Capital 
gains to farm land arise from expectations of growth in the current 
return to land [Melichar, 1979, p. 1089]. In the present model, past 
rates of real capital gain are thus used to measure expectations 
regarding growth in current returns. Table 5.2 below presents these 
expected rates of change by year and by crop reporting district in Iowa. 
Table 5,2, Five-year moving average of real rate of growth in the value of farm land in Iowa, by 
crop reporting district and five-year period 
Crop reporting 
district 1967-71 1968-72 1969-73 1970-74 1971-75 1972-76 1973-77 1974-71 
State-wide 
average -4.5% -0.8% 6.1% 10.5% 27.4% 33.1% 22.1% 16.5% 
Northwest -6.0 -1.2 7.1 11.2 30,0 38.1 24.1 17.5 
North Central -5.8 -1.7 7.5 12.8 38.0 43.9 27.3 18.8 
Northeast -3.6 -0.9 6.6 10.4 26.7 35.0 23.1 18.6 
West Central -5.8 -1.6 4.3 8.6 26.4 32.6 23.5 18.9 
Central -5.6 -2.2 5.8 10.1 32.0 40.4 28.6 17.3 
East Central -4.5 0.0 5.0 7.6 23.0 30.1 21.9 18.1 
Southwest -2.3 1.1 5,0 6.7 14.7 19.7 14.8 15.4 
South Central 0.4 0.6 6.1 11.9 12.9 17.9 14.9 10.3 
Southeast -3.5 0.2 6.6 15.7 29.3 28.2 18.8 10.2 
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As with, the gross returns variable, the hypothesized sign of the 
growth rate variable in the multiple regression analysis is positive. 
The greater the expected rate of growth in the return to farm land, the 
greater would be the price paid for that land. 
In the comparative static analysis of Chapter III, input price 
appeared as an exogenous variable while the quantity of input demanded 
appeared as an endogenous variable. In the empirical model, land price 
is treated as the dependent variable so it will not also appear as an 
explanatory variable. The relationship between land price and quantity 
demanded, as explained previously, traces the demand curve for farm land. 
The empirical model is designed to predict the price paid for the land 
input given that a certain quantity has been demanded or purchased. 
Financial structure 
The second category of variables is that lAxich describes the 
financial structure of the land buyer's firm. Optimal financial 
structure plays a limited role in the model developed in this paper 
because of the assumption that the debt level of the firm is exogenous ly 
determined. Given the additional assumption of fixed equity, it follows 
that the firm's leverage ratio is likewise exogenously determined. Since 
the firm's capitalization rate is a function in part, of its leverage 
ratio, that too will vary with the availability of debt. As a 
consequence, the firm has no independent demand fox debt. Furthermore, 
in the context of the model, the capitalization rate plays no role, across 
different buyers, in determining the amount of debt they will incur in 
buying land. 
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On the other hand, the money capital constraint plays a major role 
in the model. The availability of money capital affects the demand for 
an asset and thus the price that will be paid for that asset. Money 
capital availability is, in turn, a reflection of the debt and equity 
availability to the firm. The availability of debt will depend on the 
willingness of lenders to continue lending and of borrowers to continue 
borrowing. The willingness to continue lending or borrowing, 
respectively, can be seen to depend on, among other things, the extent 
of the borrower's equity, or more precisely, the amount of equity 
relative to debt. 
Although the data available for this study do not describe both the 
debt and equity position of land buyers, they do note the equity or net 
worth of the buyer at the time of the land purchase. Buyers indicated 
into which of the following five ranges, $0 to $50,000; $50,001 to 
$100,000; $100,001 to $150,000; $150,001 to $200,000; or $200,001 and 
above, their net worth fell. This variable offers some promise as a 
measure of the financial means of the firm at the time it purchased the 
land. It also, however, presents some problems. In the first place, 
only 73 of the 186 survey forms included the net worth information, 
leaving the problem of how to deal with missing observations. This 
problem was made particularly acute by the fact that the net worth 
variable is discontinuous and could not be easily and reliably related 
to other variables in the data set with which it may have been correlated. 
The second and probably more serious problem is that the dollar ranges 
of the five net worth categories are not able to discriminate well 
87 
among the net worths of the land buyers in the sample. Fully 55 percent 
of those buyers who responded to the net worth question indicated that 
their net worth was greater than $200,000 at the time they purchased 
the subject tract. 
In an effort to regain some of the missing observations in the net 
worth category, a procedure was used to estimate the categories of some 
of the observations where it had not been reported. It was assumed that 
the net worth category of the buyer at the time he purchased the land 
would be related to the size of his land holdings at the time of the 
purchase. For observations where the number of acres owned at the time 
of purchase was reported, a dollar value of acres owned was calculated 
by multiplying the acres owned by the county average land value (deflated) 
for the.year in which the purchase was made. The relationship between 
this "gross worth" measure and net worth was estimated by regressing the 
mid-point of the net worth category (deflated) on the value of "gross 
wealth". The mid-point chosen for the open-ended category five was 
$500,000. While this procedure yielded 49 more observations, increasing 
the total to 122, it only exacerbated the problem of the distribution of 
observations among net worth categories. In the augmented data set, 
66 percent of the observations fell into the top category. Furthermore, 
the deflating process caused all but one of the observations originally 
in category 4 to drop to category 3. 
^ alternative to using the net worth categoiries was to use the 
calculated "gross worth" figure itself as a proxy for net worth. The 
advantages of this alternative are several. First, 113 out of 186 
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observations indicated a response on acres owned, some 40 more than had 
indicated a net worth category. Second, the variable is continuous, 
making it possible to estimate a slope parameter rather than a shift in 
intercept, which is all that is possible with the use of net worth 
categories. 
Use of the value of acres owned as a proxy for net worth has its 
disadvantages as well. Farm land, although the dominant asset on a 
farmer's balance sheet is not the only source of net worth. Non-real 
estate and financial assets also exist and contribute to the net worth of 
farm operators. The balance sheet of the farming sector [USDA] shows 
that for the United States as a whole, for the years 1970-79, the 
proportion of the value of total assets of farmers accounted for by the 
value of real estate averaged 70.7 percent and ranged from 67.7 percent 
in 1977 to 73.7 percent in 1977. These statistics underscore the 
importance of real estate assets to farmers' balance sheets. It may be 
reasonable to assume that the value of other types of assets, both real 
and financial would be proportional to the value of real estate assets. 
This assumption is all the more reasonable given that virtually all of 
the buyers in the sample are owner-operators and not landlords or 
non-farm investors. Thus, they are more likely to hold similar types of 
assets. 
A second problem with using the value of acres owned is that the 
per-acre value used in the calculation is a county-wide average. Thus, 
not only is the calculated value of acres owned a proxy variable for net 
worth, it is itself only an estimate of the true value of owned land. 
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Within-county differences in farm land value are influenced by factors 
such as productivity, proximity to markets and nearness to urban areas. 
The extent of intra-county differences in land values in the present 
sample can only be conjectured. The fact that none of the counties 
represented in the sançle is heavily urban, however, removes one of the 
potential causes of intra-county variance in land values. 
A third problem is that the pro:qr variable is a measure of total 
asset value, not owner's equity in that asset. As such, it does not 
capture the variation in financial leverage among buyers. While 
knowledge of this variation would make for a more compelling conceptual 
argument with respect to the impact of buyer "wealth on farm land price, 
existing data sets which, by design include only those buyers successful 
in obtaining financing, may show such a limited range of buyer leverage 
as to render it a relatively unimportant factor, empirically. Ammng 
buyers represented by the data set, therefore, a gross measure of wealth 
may be as appropriate as a net measure. 
Despite the problems associated with using the value of acres owned 
as a proxy for net worth, it appears superior to the net worth categories, 
especially in its ability to discriminate among the wealth of the buyers 
in the sample. The hypothesis regarding net worth and thus its is 
that a greater net worth, ceteris paribus, a less severe money 
capital constraint and that a buyer with a larger net worth could afford 
to pay a higher price for land. Assuming then that a particular sale 
tract goes to the highest bidder, the impact of net worth on price will 
be positive. 
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The variable enters the multiple regression equation on a per acre 
basis. That is, the value of acres owned is divided by the number of 
acres being purchased. This procedure relates the prozy measure of net 
worth to the size of the land purchase. The availability of money 
capital in absolute terms does not fully explain its impact on the demand 
for an asset. It is the money capital availability compared to the 
money capital required, a relative concept, that is assumed to have 
the greatest explanatory power. 
In addition to indicating the relative wealth that buyers have at 
the time of purchase, it may be useful to indicate also the absolute size 
of the purchase. The size of the purchase in terms of acres has been 
found to be a significant variable in other land value studies 
[VanHove, 1978; Herr, 1975; Klinefelter, 1973]. One hypothesis regarding 
the number of acres in the sale tract is that it captures the relative 
competition in the market for tracts of different sizes. Smaller tracts 
are more affordable and thus likely to draw more bids. The increased 
competition may have a positive inçact on price. Underlying this 
market phenomenon is the fact that the purchase of larger acreages 
entails larger total down payments and larger future cash outflows. 
They involve larger credit requirements and greater risk of bankruptcy. 
Thus, only the wealthier buyers are able to contemplate the purchase of 
large tracts, which reduces the competition for the land. 
VanHove [1978, p. 75] further suggests that farm land, in general, 
may have been overpriced during the period of his sample, the years 
1974 through 1976, and while buyers may not have been too sensitive to 
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this in bidding on small tracts, they may have been much more aware of 
it when bidding on larger acreages. The hypothesis regarding acres in 
the sale tract then is that the greater the number of acres, ceteris 
paribus, the smaller the per acre price. 
Finance teirms 
Finance terms normally include provisions for the percentage of the 
purchase price that will be financed (the inverse of the down-payment 
percentage), the term of the loan, and the interest rate to be paid on 
the loan. The major interest of this research is on the impact of the 
down-payment percentage on the price paid for farm land. However, the 
sample data include cash sales, seller-financed contract sales, and 
mortgage-financed sales, so it is important to account for any differences 
among the methods of financing the sale that may have an intact on the 
selling price. 
Reinsel [1973] concluded that seller financing could have an impact 
on land price. Capital gains income from contract-financed sales can 
normally be distributed over the life of the contract, \diereas capital 
gains arising from mortgage-financed sales are usually taxable in the 
year of the sale. In the past thou^, the down payment on land contracts 
could not exceed 30 percent of the purchase price. This tax treatment 
of capital gains gives contract sellers the incentive to adjust their 
terms relative to the mortgage seller by raising the price and lowering 
the interest rate. The increments to price are distributed over the life 
of the contract and taxed at the lower capital gains rate ^ ile the 
interest income is taxed at normal rates. 
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Thus, in the past, contract sales have usually involved not only a 
smaller down payment than mortgage-financed sales, but a smaller interest 
rate and a higher purchase price as well. It was deemed necessary to 
account for this difference throu^i a variable in the multiple regression 
equation. The variable chosen for this purpose was the net value of the 
contract. This value is calculated by first determining the equivalent 
mortgage value of the contract and then subtracting that equivalent 
value from the contract price (price per acre times acres sold minus 
down payment). The equivalent mortgage value for the contract is 
calculated by discounting the contract payment stream by the appropriate 
Federal Land Bank mortgage interest rate. The contract payment stream, 
as indicated below, is the sum of the principal and interest payments 
and the balloon payment, if any. 
Equivalent Mortgage Value = (Principal + Interest) * PVIFA^ ^  
+ Balloon * PVIF (5.4) 
r ,11 
where 
PVIFA = the present value interest factor for an annuity at 
r,n 
the appropriate Federal Land Bank mortgage rate, r, 
for the number of years of the loan, n, and; 
PVIF = the present value interest factor for a single 
r ,n 
payment at the appropriate Federal Land Bank rate, 
r, for the year, n, in \âiich the balloon falls due. 
The equivalent mortgage value was calculated for all contract sales. 
In virtually every case, because the Federal Land Bank interest rate was 
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higher than the contract interest rate, the equivalent mortgage value 
was less than the contract price. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis of Reinsel [1973, p. 34] that seller financing induces a 
higher selling price for farm land. 
The inclusion of the net value of the contract for all observations 
(cash and mortgage-financed sales were assigned a value of zero) in the 
multiple regression equation accounts for the special characteristics 
of contract financing that lead to a hi^er land price for contract-
financed sales. The hypothesized sign of the variable is positive, 
the greater the contract price relative to the equivalent mortgage 
value, the higher the price per acre. 
The second variable entered in the multiple regression equation to 
account for the impact of varying financing terms was the down-payment 
percentage. This variable is very important to the major hypothesis of 
this research. The down-payment percentage is one minus the purchase 
leverage of the land buyer. Given the assun^tions of the theoretical 
model, first, that money capital is scarce and second, that the decision 
malcer is under no internal constraint on the use of debt and the 
assumptions about the market for farm land, one, that land is a 
purchase of great economic importance to buyers, and two, that the 
selling price is the result of competitive bidding, then the down-
payment percentage should have a negative impact on the selling price. 
That is, the higjhar the down payment required on a given sale, ceteris 
paribus, the lower the per-acre sale price. 
94 
Â very important assnn^tion about the do%n-payment percentage is 
that its determinants are exogenous to the model. This assun^tion is 
deemed plausible for the following reasons. First, for contract sales, 
the size of the down payment is often dictated by local custom and seller 
tax considerations. Second, for Federal Land Bank mortgages, the down-
payment percentage is dictated by the availability of funds to the system. 
Local availability during most of the 1970s may have been virtually 
infinite. Furthermore, there is no evidence from the present data that 
the required down payment is systematically related to the buyer's 
financial condition. It may be that the buyer's financial condition is 
crucial in determining whether he is successful in obtaining an FLB 
mortgage, but among those who are successful and thus included in the 
data set, mortgage terms are subject to other determinants. 
The other financing terms, the term of the loan and the interest 
rate, while important in general, were not important to this study given 
the sample and the model specification. There was not enough cross-
sectional variation in the term of loan to contribute to an explanation 
of the cross-sectional variation in land price. Interest rate differences 
between contracts and mortgages were already considered by the net value 
of the contract lAiile variations within the mortgage-financed and 
contract-financed groups were likewise not great enough to account for 
any of the variability in the price of land. 
Hissing Obseirvations 
Many of the 182 observations in the sançle were inconçlete. It was 
deemed appropriate and desirable, however, to salvage as many 
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observations as possible since those that were incomplete with regard to 
some items still contained other valuable information. By and large, 
the limit on the number of usable observations was given by the number 
that contained a response on the acres owned variable. This variable 
is crucial to the calculation of the value of acres owned t^ich serves 
as a proiqr in this model for the net worth of the buyer. There were, 
as stated earlier, 113 observations which included a response to acres 
owned. 
There were 11 observations that did not have an acres owned 
response but did indicate a net worth category. For these 11 
observations, the estimated value of acres owned was found by first, 
regressing the value of acres owned on the mid-point of the net worth 
category for the 69 observations in which these two variables existed. 
The estimated coefficient for net worth category that resulted was then 
multiplied by the value of the mid-points of the net worth categories of 
the 11 observations. All of the dollar amounts were deflated, of course, 
to reflect the 1972 price level. These observations m^ have included 
some in which acres owned are actually zero. The value of acres owned 
for such observations would likewise be zero, but since the value of 
acres owned is itself only a proxy for net worth, the value of acres 
owned will be considered to be that which results from the multiplication 
of the mid-point of the net worth category and the regression coefficient. 
This estimating procedure yielded 11 more observations \^ich brought 
the total to 124. Of these, however, some were missing information on 
variables other than acres owned. Ei^teen of the observations had a 
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missing value for down payment. The dollar down payment amount is used 
to calculate the down-payment percentage variable. The value of these 
missing observations was estimated by substituting, in each case, the 
average down-payment percentage for the year in which the observation 
fell and type of financing, contract or mortgage, that financed the sale. 
Twelve of the otherwise usable observations were missing a value 
for total com yield. The estimating procedure for this variable was to 
substitute the county average com yield per acre in the year prior to the 
year of sale for the county in which the tract lay. These observations, 
when added to the model, contributed nothing to the significance of the 
2 
coefficients while lowering the R of the regression equation by nearly 
18 percent. This group of observations included one tract with a very 
low selling price ($281 per acre) and several with very high selling 
prices (over $2500 per acre). It was decided to drop all 12 from 
consideration since they increased the error sum of squares of the model 
so drastically. 
The remaining 112 observations spanned the years of the sample 
period, 1969 to 1979. Since the number of observations in each of the 
years 1969 through 1974 was so sparse, all observations falling in those 
years were dropped from the final sample. There were 18 such 
observations, so their exclusion reduced the final sangle size to 96 
observations. 
Estimation of the Regression Parameters 
Two models were fit using the variables described in the preceding 
pages. The first of these models, identified as model 1, is defined as 
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follows ; 
DPRACRE = F (GRSRET, REALCAPG, GRSWRTHA, ACRES, 
CNTRCTVA, FERCDWN) 
where 
DPRACRE = the per acre sale price of farm land, deflated by 
the implicit GNP price deflator, 1972 = 100; 
GRSRET = return to com production, defined as the product 
of the expected price of com, deflated, and the 
yield in bushels per acre; 
REALCAPG = the expected real capital gains to holding farm 
land; 
GRSV3RTHA = the deflated dollar value of acres owned by the 
land buyer at the time he made the purchase, 
divided by the number of acres in the tract being 
purchased; 
ACRES = the number of acres in the subject tract; 
CNTRCTVA = the deflated dollar value of the land contract, 
divided by the number of acres in the sale tract; 
and 
PERCDWN = the down-payment percentage on the land sale. 
The second model, model 2, is identical in every way but one; the 
gross retum variable, GRSRET, is separated into its two components, 
CORIUPR, the expected price of com and TOTYIELD, the expected com 
yield on the acres in the sale tract. In model 2, coefficients were 
estimated for each of these variables. 
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The parameter estimates for models 1 and 2 are presented in 
Table 5.3 below. 
Hetero skedasticity 
Before discussing the results of the estimation, a question arises 
regarding the regression model and the estimated coefficients. The 
ordinary least squares procedure used in the estimation assumes that the 
residuals produced by the estimation have a common variance. If this 
condition, referred to as homoskedasticity, is violated, then the 
estimated coefficients, while still unbiased, are inefficient and their 
estimated variances are biased. The consequences are that the confidence 
limits and tests of significance developed for ordinary least squares 
estimators are no longer valid. When the disturbances are not 
homoskedastic, the confidence intervals and acceptance regions constructed 
under ordinary least squares assumptions will be wider or narrower than 
they should be [Maddala, 1977, p. 259]. 
In the present model, the presence of heteroskedasticity seems most 
plausible with respect to the proxy variable for net worth (the value of 
acres owned). In a maimer analogous to consumption expenditures across 
income groups, the land buyer with the greater wealth may have more 
discretion in the price he can bid on farm land. This may create unequal 
variances across the wealth groups with the wealthier groups exhibiting 
the larger variances. 
The Goldfeld-Quandt procedure was used to test for the existence of 
heteroskedasticity with respect to wealth levels [Goldfeld and Quandt, 
1965]. This procedure requires that the data set be divided into 
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Table 5.3. Estimated coefficients for models 1 and 2 using ordinary 
least squares, t-ratios in parentheses 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
INTERCEPT 234.36^ -312.82 
(1.54) (-0.69) 
GRSKET 6.66^ 
(8.01) 
COBNPR — 152.78 
(0.62) 
TOTYIELD — 12.69^ 
(8.25) 
KEALCAPG -2.44 8.55 
(-0.45) (1.23) 
GRSWKCHA 0.008^ 0.007^ 
(3.13) (2.54) 
ACRES -0.96^ -1.01^ 
(-2.52) (-2.54) 
CNTRCrVA 0.70 0.83 
(1.04) (1.27) 
PERCDWN -360.24^ -307.84*' 
(-3.56) (-3.09) 
n 96 96 
F 17.53 17.40 
R^ 0.54 0.58 
indicates significance at the 10% level. 
^Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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subsets across the values of the independent variable of interest. 
Separate regressions are then run for subsets at the low and hi^ ranges, 
respectively, of the independent variable. The error sums of squares 
produced by these regressions can then be used to test the null 
hypothesis that they are not significantly different. 
Two subsets of 24 observations each were taken from the present 
data set, the first reflecting low wealth ($250 to $1500 of wealth per 
acre purchased) and the second, high wealth ($5000 and more of wealth 
per acre purchased). Since, a priori, the second group was expected to 
have the greater variance, the error sum of squares of the wealthier 
buyers served as the numerator in the F statistic and the error sum of 
squares of the less wealthy group as the denominator. The calculated 
value was 1.06. This compares to a critical F value, with the 
appropriate degrees of freedom, of 2.33 at the 5 percent level of 
significance. Thus, the hypothesis of homoskedasticity cannot be 
rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. 
There are several reasons why heteroskedasticity may not be present 
with respect to the wealth variable. First, the buyer wealth is 
deflated by the size of the tract being purchased so that the wealth 
variable is actually in relative and not absolute terms. Second, the 
wealth variable reflects, in the majority of cases, only the buyer's 
real estate wealth and not his total wealth. For these reasons, the 
buyers who occupy the lower and higher ranges of the wealth variable, 
respectively, may not necessarily be the least and most wealthy in 
absolute terms. 
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Discussion of parameter estimates 
The coefficients of all variables except one, real capital gains, 
are of the hypothesized sign. Furthermore, all variables but the real 
capital gains and the value of the land contract are significant at 
normally accepted levels. 
The sign and magnitude of the variable GRSKET suggest that for 
every one unit change in expected gross returns, the price of farm land 
increases by 6.66 units. Thus, a $1 increase in expected gross returns 
would lead to a $6.66 increase in the price of farm land. These dollar 
amounts, as noted previously, refer to real dollars. 
The variable BEALCAPG is of neither the correct sign nor significant. 
Expected capital gains vas anticipated to have a very important positive 
impact on the price of farm land, especially over the period of the 
sample. The reason for the unexpected results may lie in the potential 
multicollinearity between the variable GRSRET, tAiich is a function of the 
expected price of com and SEALCAP6, which reflects the expected average 
annual percentage change in the value of farm land in Iowa. As shown in 
Table 5.4, the largest increases in land values in Iowa coincided with 
the most substantial increases in the price of com. Com prices fell 
absolutely in 1975, 1976 and 1977 while farm land prices continued to 
rise, though at a lesser rate of gain. However, as suggested by the 
specification of the gross returns (GRSKET) and real capital gains 
(BEALCAPG) variables, the demand for farm land is subject to 
expectations regarding future retums. If these expectations are some 
function of past price behavior, then the divergence between the two 
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Table 5.4. A comparison of com prices and farm real estate prices in 
Iowa, statewide average, 1969-1979 
Com Farm land 
Year 
% change from 
$/bu. year earlier $/acre 
% change from 
year earlier 
1969 1.09 7.9 419 2.5 
1970 1.17 7.3 419 0.0 
1971 1.04 -11.1 430 2.6 
1972 1.11 6.7 482 12.0 
1973 1.81 63.1 635 31.9 
1974 2.87 58.6 834 31.3 
1975 2.66 -7.3 1,095 31.3 
1976 2.45 -7.9 1,368 24.9 
1977 1.98 -19.2 1,450 6.0 
1978 2.04 3.0 1,646 13.5 
1979 2.25 10.3 1,958 19.0 
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price series in 1975, 1976 and 1977 is not necessarily inconsistent. 
Additionally, of course, the price of com is only one of the prices 
relevant to evaluating the return to farm land in Iowa. Thus, since the 
real capital gain variable was constructed from the Iowa farm land price 
series and since the price series is, to a degree, correlated with the 
corn price series, there is a potential for multicolinearity in a model 
that includes both the com price and real capital gains. Another 
regression model, referred to as model 2a, which excluded the price of 
com and included total yield and real capital gains was fit. In that 
model, as shown in Table 5.5, the coefficient for BEALCAPG was both 
positive and significant. 
Model 2, shown in Table 5.4, estimates a separate coefficient for 
the price of com (COKNPR) and total corn yield (TOTYIELD). The 
coefficient of COENPR., while of the correct sign, is not significant. 
TOTYIELD, also of the correct sign, is significant at the one percent 
level. The coefficient for total yield suggests that a one unit 
increase in the com yield per acre will raise the per acre land price 
by 12.5 units. These units, as defined in the model, are bushels per 
acre and dollars per acre, respectively. 
In model 2, the variable BEALCAPG has an estimated coefficient of 
8.5, which is of the correct sign, and a standard error of 7.0. This 
produces a t-ratio which, while not significant at normally reported 
levels, is significant at the 15 percent level. The interpretation of 
this coefficient is that a one unit increase in real capital gains, lAiich 
amounts to a one percentage point, raises the price of farm land by 
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Table 5.5. Estimated coefficients for model 2a (the variable C0S1ŒB. 
excluded) using ordinary least squares, t-ratios in 
parentheses 
Variable Model 2a 
INTERCEPT -39.76 
(-0.24) 
TOTÏIEID 11.14* 
(8.02) 
REALCâPG 16.87* 
(4.30) 
GRSWRTHA 0.007* 
(2.55) 
ACRES -1.15* 
(3.18) 
CNTRCTVA 0.55 
(1.25) 
PERCDWN -264.24* 
(-2.72) 
n 96 
F 19.98 
R2 0.55 
indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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$8.50 per acre. 
For the remaining variables in models 1, 2, and 2a, there was 
virtually no difference in the coefficients and their levels of 
significance. The coefficients estimated in model 2 will be discussed 
because of their slightly smaller standard errors. 
Referring again to Table 5.3, the coefficient for the variable 
GRSWRTHA is seen to be positive, as hypothesized, and significant at the 
one percent level. The variable 6RSURIHÂ is a measure of the value of 
the farm real estate owned by the buyer at the time he made the subject 
purchase, divided by the number of acres in the purchased tract. While 
the sign of 6RSWRIEÂ. is correct, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
quite small. A $1 increase in the value of acres owned per acre to be 
purchased would increase the price paid for those additional acres by 
$.007 per acre. However, there is no reason to expect a very large 
impact. Most studies on the determinants of farm land prices indicate 
that the characteristics of the sale tract itself and conditions in the 
markets for agricultural output are the most ing»ortant determinants of 
price [Reynolds and Timmons, 1969; Klinefelter, 1973; Herr, 1975; Chavas 
and Shumway, 1982; Sandrey et al., 1982]. The present study confirms 
these findings but suggests, as well, that some other factors are of 
importance. 
In interpreting the coefficient of GRSWRTHA it must be kept in mind 
that, given the variable's specification, it does not address the issue 
of how absolute wealth may affect the price paid for farm land. Instead, 
it suggests how wealth, relative to the size of the purchase, may affect 
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the price paid. As mentioned in the discussion on heteroskedasticity, a 
buyer's position vis-a-vis others on the GRSUEŒHÂ scale will not 
necessarily match his position on a scale denoting absolute wealth. 
But, in the market for farm land, the inçact of wealth on any given 
transaction would depend on how that wealth could be brou^t to bear on 
that particular purchase. To the extent that the coefficient of GRS^NEiXHA. 
is positive, it suggests that relative wealth does have a role, ceteris 
paribus, in determining the price bid for farm land. 
ACRES, the variable representing the number of acres in the sale 
tract, had an estimated coefficient of -1.0 which means that a one 
acre increase in tiie size of the sale tract lowers the sale price, 
in real terms, by $1.00. The reasons for this, as discussed earlier, 
involve competition in the market for farm land. The smaller tracts are 
likely to draw more bidders and perhaps more vigorous bidding from 
expansion buyers than larger tracts. 
The variable \diich denotes the net value of the land contract, 
CNTRCTVA, is of the correct sign, positive, but like EEALCAPG is 
significantly different than zero only at the 15 percent level. This 
coefficient, whose estimated value is 0.83, should be close to one. It 
measures the value of a land contract compared to a mortgage of 
equivalent principal and interest payments and equivalent terms made at 
the same time and the net contract value should, for the most part, 
translate into a hi^er land price on a dollar for dollar basis. 
The final variable in the regression equation, PERCDWN, is both 
negative, as hypothesized, and significant at the one percent level. Ko 
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hypothesis vas formulated about the expected magnitude of the coefficient. 
The coefficient measures the intensity of the money capital constraint 
facing the land buyer. Thus, a larger absolute value would indicate a 
more severe money capital constraint and a smaller absolute value, a 
less severe money capital constraint. The value of the coefficient 
estimated in model 2 was -307.84 which can be interpreted to mean that a 
one unit decrease in the down-payment percentage, a change in the 
required percentage of one percent, raises the price of farm land by 
$3.07 per acre. 
The Interaction Between Down-Payment Percentage and Wealth 
The theoretical model described in Chapter III suggests that the 
magnitude of the coefficient of the variable PERCDWN could be influenced 
by the amount of equity available to the buyer. In its most general 
application, the model of decision maker behavior expressed in 
Equation (3.41) could be solved for the demand for debt as well as the 
demand for factor inputs. The demand for debt would be some function of 
the availability of equity assuming that the decision maker's 
capitalization rate varied with his leverage ratio. 
But, even without endogenously determined debt; with instead, the 
assumption that the buyer is taking all the debt that is offered to him, 
the value of his initial equity may still have an intact on the way the 
down-payment percentage affects the price he bids for farm land. This 
occurs simply because the impact of the down-payment percentage (the 
coefficient of PERCDWN in the regression equation) measures the severity 
of the money capital constraint and the severity of the money capital 
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constraint is also a function of the availability of money capital in 
the form of existing equity. Using the variable GRSWRTHÂ as a proxy for 
the existing level of equity, the hypothesized interaction between 
down-payment percentage and buyer wealth can be introduced into the 
regression equation by adding an interaction term [Knenta, 1971, pp. 455-
457]. This term, with the variable name INTERACT, is the product of 
the variables PERGDWN and GRSWRTHA. 
The hypothesis about the sign of this variable may best be 
approached from the analysis of Tumovslg [1970] regarding the 
relationship between debt and equity. His analysis suggests that debt 
and equity are likely to be complementary methods of finance \^en the 
level of existing equity is small and likely to be substitute methods 
when the existing level of equity is high [Tumovsky, 1970, p. 1078]. 
In the present case, one could hypothesize, given the traditional debt 
accumulation patterns of farmers, that younger farmers who are generally 
less wealthy, hoping to build up the value of their assets on a given 
equity base, would regard debt and equity as conçlements, while 
established farmers, more likely to have achieved an optimal scale of 
production, would regard the two as substitutes. This "life cycle" 
view of farming suggests a period of debt accumulation followed by a 
period of debt retirement. To say that debt and equity are regarded as 
complements is to say that an increase in the equity available to the 
firm would increase the amount of debt used. The firm's leverage ratio, 
in other words, would remain constant or increase as its equity base 
rose. To say that debt and equity are substitutes, on the other hand. 
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is to say that an increase in equity will result in a concomitant 
decrease in debt use. 
Those land buyers with smaller equity could thus be expected to be 
more sensitive to changes in the down-payment percentage. That is, 
their demand for land and the price they would be willing to pay, 
ceteris paribus, would be more responsive to changes in the down-payment 
requirement. 
Conceptually, therefore, the sign of the variable INTERACT is 
ambiguous. Looking at the complete regression model with the interaction 
term, 
DPRACRE = a + (GRSRET) + (SEALCAPG) 
+ P3 (GRSWR.THA) + (ACRES) 
+ (CNTRCTVA) + pg (PERCDWN) 
+ P^ (INTERACT) (5.5) 
where 
INTERACT = PERCDWN * GRSWRTHA . 
The impact of the variable PERCDWN on the dependent variable DPRACRE 
in this model is given by the expression: 
= % + P, C®S»RTHA) . (5.6) 
This expression states that the impact of the down-payment percentage 
changes with the level of wealth. If the coefficient pg is negative as 
suggested by the previous analysis, and debt and equity are regarded as 
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substitute methods of finance, then would have to be positive to 
reflect the modifying influence of the equity level on the impact of 
the down-payment percentage on price paid. If this were true, an 
increase in the required down-payment percentage, while still having a 
negative impact, would have a less negative impact as the equity level 
rose. If debt and equity relate as complements, the sign of the 
coefficient, gy should be negative. An increase in the down-payment 
requirement while, again, having a negative intact, would have a more 
negative impact as equity level rose. If, on the other hand, the down-
payment requirement fell, the positive impact on price would be even more 
positive at high equity levels. 
The data used in this study do not, of course, describe the behavior 
of an individual buyer over varying levels of equity, but instead 
describe the behavior of the land market when buyers with varying levels 
of wealth bid for farm land. To say that buyers at the low and high ends 
of the GRSiŒŒHÂ variable regard debt and equity as complements and 
substitutes in financing, respectively, disregards the fact that the 
level of equity is really a relative concept and that two buyers with 
the same level of equity may regard the absolute size of that level in 
entirely different ways. But, even if the statement is made that those 
lower on the scale of the variable GRSUEŒHÂ regard debt and equity as 
complements and those hi^er on the scale regard them as substitutes, 
the sign of INTERACT may still be ambiguous since it would depend on 
f&ich group dominated. 
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On the other hand, several factors would seem to favor the 
hypothesis that debt and equity be viewed as complementary forms of 
finance, at least among farm land buyers. For one thing, the rate of 
growth in nominal land prices in Iowa, which averaged almost 20 percent 
in the latter half of the 1970s, encouraged the use of borrowed funds 
to purchase land. For another, Federal Land Bank funds were generally 
available during this period at very competitive rates of interest. 
Finally, the population of farm land buyers is likely to include a large 
proportion of farmers in early to mid-career (in the present sample, the 
average number of years in farming is 18) who would tend to be in the 
acquisition stage of their life cycles. 
Both model 1 and model 2 were reestimated with the addition of the 
interaction term. The results, with the models labelled 4 and 5, are 
presented in Table 5.6 below. 
The addition of the interaction term does not materially alter the 
value or statistical significance of most of the variables in the models. 
The variable whose coefficient is most affected is GRSIJRTHA. The value 
of the coefficient is increased and the statistical significance is 
reduced to the five percent level in the case of model 4 and the ten 
percent level in the case of model 5. 
The sign of the coefficient of the variable INTERACT is negative in 
both cases but the t-ratios are rather low, -1.36 and -0.80 for model 4 
and model 5, respectively. These suggest that for model 4 at least, 
the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the ten percent 
level. The implication of the negative sign of the coefficient is, as 
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Table 5.6. Estimated coefficients for models 4 and 5 (with 
interaction term) using ordinary least squares, t-ratios 
in parentheses 
Variable Model 4 Model 5 
USTERŒPT 181.61 -373.72 
(1.16) (-0.82) 
GRSRET 6.46* 
(7.67) 
COKNPR — 177.48 
(0.71) 
TOTYIELD — 12.46* 
(7.95) 
BEALCAPG -1.71 8.25 
(-0.31) (1.18) 
6RSWRTHA 0.02^ 0.01® 
(2.09) (1.39) 
ACRES -0.84^ -0.94* 
(-2.15) (-2.47) 
CNTRCTVA 0.60 0.76 
(0.90) (1.16) 
PERCDWN -282.47* -266.13* 
(-2.44) (-2.36) 
INTERACT -0.02^ -0.01 
(-1.36) (-0.80) 
n 96 96 
F 15.44 15.24 
R^ 0.55 0.58 
*lndicates significance at the 1% level. 
^Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
®Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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discussed earlier, that the intact of the down-payment percentage on 
the price paid for farm land, which is negative, is more negative at 
higher levels of SRSWRTHA. This further implies that a decrease 
(increase) in the required down-payment percentage will then have a 
greater positive (negative) impact on the price paid for farm land the 
higher the level of equity as measured by GRSVRXHÂ. 
Elasticities 
To further aid in the interpretation of the regression coefficients, 
the elasticities of the coefficients estimated in models 1 and 2 were 
calculated and are presented in Table 5.7. 
The elasticities were calculated at the mean values of the 
independent variables and represent a measure of the responsiveness of 
the dependent variable, DPRACKE, to changes in the values of the 
independent variables. As a ratio of the percentage change in one 
variable to the percentage change in another variable, the elasticity 
coefficient is unit-free. 
The elasticity coefficients calculated for model 1 show that changes 
in the per acre price of farm land are largest with respect to changes in 
the level of gross returns. The elasticity coefficient for GRSBET is 
1.02 meaning that a one percent change in gross returns leads to a 1.02 
percent change in the price of farm land. At the sangle meanR of the 
variables GRSRET and DPRACRE, a one percent increase in GRSKET, $1.88, 
would result in an increase of $12.54 per acre in the price of farm land. 
The variable with the next largest elasticity is PERCDWN. Its 
coefficient can be interpreted to mean that a one percent change in the 
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Table 5.7. Elasticity coefficients for the parameter estimates of 
models 1 and 2 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
=3 E. 3 
6RSRET 6.66* 1.02 — — — — — — 
COKNPR — --- 152.78 0.23 
TOTYIELD - — 12.69* 1.05 
REALCAPG -2.44 -0.04 8.55 0.13 
6RSWRTHA 0.008* 0.03 0.007* 0.03 
ACRES -0.96* -0.10 -1.01* -0.11 
CNTRCTVA 0.70 0.01 0.83 0.01 
PERCDm -360.24* -0.11 -307.84* -0.10 
indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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percentage down-payment requirement results in a .11 percent change, in 
the opposite direction, in the per acre price of farm land. For example, 
at the mean values of DPRACRE and PERCDWN, $1229 and 39 percent, 
respectively, a one percent increase from the mean in the down-payment 
percentage, 0.4 percent, would result in a reduction of the per acre 
price for farm land of .11 percent or $1.35. Given the average sized 
sale tract, 129 acres, the total price would fall by $174. In a, perhaps, 
more meaningful comparison, if the down-payment percentage requirement 
rose by one percentage point, from 39 percent to 40 percent, the per 
acre price of farm land would be expected to fall by .28 percent or 
$3.44. On the basis of 129 acres, the average size sale tract, this 
decrease amounts to $443.76. 
Other elasticity coefficients of interest in model 1 are those of 
the variables GRSWRTHA and ACRES. The coefficient for GRSlŒtTHA, 0.03, 
implies that a one percent increase in GRSWRTEA, $53 at the mean value, 
would result in an increase of .03 percent or $.37 in the per acre 
price of farm land. The responsiveness of price to the number of acres 
in the sale tract is greater, as reflected in the elasticity coefficient 
of -0.10. A one percent increase in the size of the sale tract, 1.3 
acres at the mean value, means an increase of .10 percent or $1.23 in 
the per acre price of land. 
The elasticity coefficients in model 2 for t±e variables GEISWRTHA, 
ACRES, and PERCDWN are quite similar to those in model 1. An additional 
elasticity of interest in model 2 is that for total com yield. The 
elasticity for TOTYIELD is 1.05 which implies that a one percent increase 
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in total corn yield would result in a slightly greater than one percent 
increase, 1.05 percent, in the per acre price of land. At the mean 
sample value of TOTYIELD, 102 bushels of coim per acre, this means that 
an increase in yield of 1,02 bushels per acre results in a $12.53 per 
acre increase in the price of land. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AMD CONCLUSIONS 
Objectives 
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of the 
interrelationship between farm financial structure, the down-payment 
requirements for farm land purchase and the price paid for farm land. 
Three hypotheses emerged from this examination. The first is that 
the required down-payment percentage on farm land purchases in part 
determines money capital availability. And, in turn, this availability 
affects the demand for and therefore the price of farm land. The second 
hypothesis is that the amount of equity available to the decision maker 
at the time he makes the farm land acquisition also influences, in a 
positive manner, the price he pays. The third hypothesis is a 
suggestion that there is an interaction between down-payment percentage 
and equity availability that bears on the intact of the down-payment 
percentage. These three hypotheses are examined both theoretically 
and empirically. 
Theoretical and Statistical Analyses 
This study has employed the neo-classical model of firm behavior 
in deriving the demand for farm land under the condition of money capital 
scarcity. The objective function is defined as the discounted return 
to owner's equity. The demand for fixed inputs (i.e. farm land) is 
shown to be a function of the price of the firm's output, the price of 
all inputs, and the availability of money capital from both debt and 
equity sources. With the assunçtion that the level of equity is fixed. 
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the availability of money capital depends on the availability of debt 
which is reflected in the down-payment requirement. Dhen money capital 
is constraining, the fixed input price at whitAi firm equilibrium is 
achieved is lower, ceteris paribus. than when money capital is not a 
constraint. An easing of the constraint through more liberal down-
payment terms will, ceteris paribus, raise the equilibrium level of 
employment of the fixed input. Differences in the initial level of 
equity will likewise have an impact, through the shadow price of the 
money capital constraint, on the input price level at which equilibrium 
between the value of the marginal product and the marginal factor cost 
is achieved. Because the down-payment requirement and the initial 
equity level both bear on the availability of money capital, an 
interaction between the two may also exist. Specifically, as the initial 
equity level varies, the impact of changes in the down-payment requirement 
may also vary. 
Empirical testing of these hypotheses has been accomplished with the 
use of a single equation econometric model. In a cross-sectional 
analysis of farm land sales in Iowa, the dependent variable, per-acre 
price paid for farm land, is hypothesized to be a function of gross 
return, represented by the price of com and the com yield of the land, 
real capital gains to farm land, the gross value of farm land already 
owned by the buyer at the time of the purchase, the acres in the sale 
tract, the differential in sale price due to contract financing and the 
down-payment percentage on the purchase. The down-payment percentage 
and gross value of buyer's real estate variables tested the hypotheses 
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regarding the impact of money capital scarcity ^ ile the other variables 
were included to set the ceteris paribus conditions. The model was 
reestimated with the addition of an interaction term to test the third 
major hypothesis. 
The results of the statistical analysis showed that the first two 
hypotheses could not be rejected at normally accepted levels of 
significance. The down-payment percentage and the equity level of the 
buyer, as proxied by the value of his farm real estate, did indeed have 
the anticipated impacts on the price paid for farm land. The third 
hypothesis, that of an interaction between down-payment percentage 
and equity level could be accepted, but only with less confidence. The 
sign of the interaction variable turned out to be negative \diich in^lies 
that a higher (lower) level of wealth relative to the number of acres 
purchased has a hei^tening (dampening) effect on the impact of the 
down-payment percentage on the price of farm land. 
Conclusions 
The three hypotheses that are directly addressed, though narrow in 
focus, are much broader in implications. Three areas upon which the 
results of the statistical analysis may shed some light have been 
identified. These are, first, the correctness of the assumptions of 
money capital scarcity and no internal capital rationing upon which the 
model is conditioned; second, the relationship between the price of farm 
land and its value as derived from conventional valuation formulas; and 
third, the impact of existing wealth on bid prices for land and the 
resulting pattern of farm land ownership. 
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Turning to the first of these three areas, the model from lAiich 
all hypotheses have been drawn assumes that money capital is a scarce 
commodity and that no internal capital rationing takes place. In the 
absence of money capital scarcity the model developed to trace the 
impact of down-payment percentage would collapse to the standard 
neoclassical model of input demand wherein the availability of funds to 
purchase inputs is not at issue. The fact that the price of farm land 
has been shown to be influenced by the percentage down-payment requirement 
implies that availability of funds is indeed an issue in input demand 
and that a model which allows for money capital scarcity is a more 
accurate representation of reality. 
The assumption of no internal capital rationing is more difficult 
to justify. While land buyers have been seen to have responded to more 
credit by bidding land prices upward, they may still have been subject 
to some internal constraint as to the amount of credit they would use. 
Thus, they might have been making larger down payments than they would 
have had to because they felt the risks of taking on additional 
debt to be too great. The estimation of the model with the interaction 
term perhaps lends some clarification to this issue. One might expect 
those with greater equity to be the most likely candidates for internal 
capital rationing because they are more likely to have achieved the 
financial structure they desire. If this were the case, the sign of 
the interaction term would be positive, indicating that the intact of 
the down-payment percentage on price was less for those with greater 
equity. The sign of the interaction term is instead negative \Aiich 
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implies that the buyers with the greatest equity were, in fact, most 
responsive in terms of bidding to changes in the down-payment percentage. 
While this does not prove the case for no internal capital rationing, 
it does indicate that the group most likely to be subject to internal 
rationing is actually more responsive to external capital rationing. 
The previously discussed warnings apply to this analysis. That is, 
first, the statistical significance of the interaction variable is weak 
and second, the equity of buyers is measured by the proxy variable, 
value of acres already owned. 
The second issue on which the results of the statistical analysis 
may have some bearing is the issue of farm land price versus farm land 
value and the adjustments between them. This issue is not entirely 
separate from the issue of the presence or absence of money capital 
scarcity. By definition, an operative constraint means that the limited 
resource has a positive marginal value to the function being maximized. 
Both market price and valuation price are made under conditions of 
limited information and misinformation. Furthermore, land valuation as 
conventionally practiced does not account well for the characteristics 
of the potential buyer such as his access to credit. A land 
valuation or net present value formulation can employ a hi^er discount 
rate to reflect the scarcity of credit but, realistically, credit is 
often made more available at no significant increase in cost or is 
unavailable at any price. The model developed and used in this study 
more nearly captures that aspect of credit availability. The empirical 
results of the present study suggest that farm land prices, even though 
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considered "high", still lagged perceived value, since credit expansion 
to buyers had a positive impact on market price. In this regard, the 
results of the study concur with a recent article by Shalit and 
Schmitz [1982]. These authors contend that increases in the supply of 
credit to farms with land as collateral will cause farm land prices to 
rise at a faster rate than with no increase in supply. They go on to 
say that the expansion and contraction of credit has an important impact 
on the pace of farm land price increases or decreases [Shalit and 
Schmitz, 1982, p. 718]. This conclusion makes sense in light of the 
fact that the farm land market operates under a credit constraint and 
the more responsive credit supply is (the less sticky the credit 
constraint) the more quickly land prices will adjust to perceived land 
value. A question for policy makers that arises from this is to what 
extent can changes in Federal Land Bank regulations concerning minimum 
down-payment requirements or changes in tax laws that encourage or 
discourage the use of land contracts influence the rate of adjustment 
of farm land prices. 
The third area of issues is that of the impact of existing wealth 
on the price and ownership of farm land. The empirical model proved 
that the level of existing wealth in terms of the value of owned farm 
land relative to the size of the purchase had a positive impact on the 
price of farm land. This clearly suggests that, ceteris paribus, the 
wealthier buyer enjoys a bidding advantage in the market for farm land, 
a result consistent with the hypotheses of Lee and Rask [1976] and 
Harris and Nehring [1976]. Credit made available through lower 
123 
down-payment requirements, across-the-board to buyers would presumably 
heighten that bidding advantage while at the same time raising land 
prices even further. 
Some additional evidence as to the impact of wealth and credit 
availability comes from the analysis of the interaction model. This 
model suggests that the wealthier buyers are more responsive to 
variations in required down-payment percentage which means that, in the 
case of lower down-payment requirements, wealthier buyers combine both 
their superior wealth and the more liberal credit terms to bid land 
prices upward. 
The resulting ownership pattern would be more farm land concentrated 
in fewer hands. This, as well, has implications for policy makers in 
their attempts to influence such ownership patterns. Credit 
availability may have to be targeted to specific groups if more wide­
spread ownership of farm land is desired. 
Limitations of the Study 
Perhaps the most important limitation of the present study is that 
the model developed to analyze the data is only a special case of a 
more general specification. To a large extent, the limitations of the 
available data set demanded this. 
The more general specification of the model would solve the 
Lagrangian function (presented as Equation (3.41) in Chapter III) for 
the optimal level of debt as well as the optimal levels of factor input 
use. The demand for debt would be seen to be a function not only of 
the current interest rate and the current leverage ratio of the firm. 
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but also of how the addition of debt to the firm's financial structure 
would influence the interest rate it paid and the discount rate it used 
in evaluating additional profits. In terms of an econometric model, 
the demand for debt and the price of farm land would be solved by the 
use of the two-stage least squares procedure using the estimated demand 
for debt as an argument in the farm land price equation. Such a model 
would require a data set that would discriminate «mnng land buyers on 
the basis of their accumulated debt. 
A second limitation has again to do with the specification of the 
model. Although the land prices the model is attempting to predict arise 
from decisions made by both buyer and seller, the model specified to 
predict them is derived from consideration of buyer behavior only. In 
other words, the model is not a market model even though farm land 
prices are market determined. Some of the factors that influence the 
supply of farm land are identical to those that influence demand. The 
expected price of farm commodities and expected capital gains on farm 
land would likely be of importance to both supply and demand. But, 
other factors such as off-farm employment opportunities and age and 
financial condition of the seller may also have important impacts on 
the market price of farm land. 
A third limitation concerns the derivation of the expected com 
price and expected real capital gains variables. The explanatory power 
of these two may be much greater in a time series model «here more 
variation with respect to expectations may occur. However, even in a 
strictly cross-sectional study there would likely be sizable variation 
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in expectations of future prices and capital gains that might be a 
function of buyer characteristics such as age, education, wealth, 
experience in farming and experience in buying land. In the present 
study, expected com prices and capital gains are generated from a 
simple averaging of past prices. A more sophisticated or, at least, 
more discriminatory device for generating expectations would possibly 
improve the accuracy of the variables. 
The final limitation has to do directly with the available data set. 
In particular, the lack of a more exact measure of buyer equity limits 
the reliability of the statistical results. The use of a proxy variable 
introduces measurement errors into the regression equation and the 
ordinary least squares procedure applied to this equation may produce 
an inconsistent estimator. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Future research in the area of capital availability and land prices 
might well expand the model and analysis presented in this study to 
include a consideration of endogenously determined debt. Miile a 
complete financial profile of land buyers may be difficult to obtain, it 
may be possible to construct an adequate data set from \diat is available. 
The implications of the balance sheet and financial structure for 
asset demand are well-known in financial theory. Their implications 
within the context of economic theory can be easily ascertained once 
some of the simplifying assumptions of the neoclassical model of firm 
behavior are relaxed. Examination of these implications has a long 
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though, sporadic literature. Empirical verification of these 
implications has virtually no literature and that is the area toward 
which future research might profitably be directed. 
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APPENDIX: COMPARABLE SALE WORKSHEET 
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Comparable Sale Worksheet 
Con^aràble Sale # Student Name 
I. TRANSFER INFORMATION (AUDITOR'S OFFICE) 
A. Seller (Grantor): B. Buyer (Grantee); 
C. Date of Instrument: D. Number of Acres: 
E. County: Township: Nearest Town; 
F. Legal Description: 
II. SAUE PRICE INFORMATION (RECORDER'S OFFICE) 
A. Deed Book (Verify Legal Description) 
1. Consideration Shown: $ 
2. Date of Deed; 3. Stamp Tax; $ 
4. Other (e.g. assumed mortgage); 
B. Mortgage and Contract Book 
1. Type of Financing (Check One); Mortgage ; Contract 
2. Date of Mortgage or Contract: 
3. Downpayment: $ 
4. Amount of Mortgage or Contract: $ 
5. Interest Rate; % 
6. Term: years 
7. Payment Pattern 
a. Periodic Payments: $ 
b. Balloon Payment; $ 
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C. Sale Price Verification 
1. Verification by; 
Date: Place; 
2. Consideration Paid; $_ 
3. Per Acre Value: $ 
III. ASSESSMEIST AND TAX INFORMATION (ASSESSOR'S AND TREASURER'S OFFICE) 
A. Date of Assessment: 
B. Assessed Value 
1. Land; $ 2. Buildings: $ 
3. Total: $ 
C. Tax Levy: $ /thousand 
D. Total Taxes: $ 
E. Taxes Per Acre: $ 
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF FARM (ASSESSOR'S OFFICE AND OTHER) 
A. Location; 
1. Distance to Nearest Farm Supply and Marketing Center: 
miles 
2. Road Surface (Check One): County Gravel ; County 
Blacktop ; State Hi^way ; Federal Highway 
B. Productivity (Under Highest and Best Use): 
1. Number of Tillable Acres: 
2. Number of Acres in Permanent Pasture: 
3. Number of Acres in Waste and Farmstead: 
4. Total Farm Average CSR: 
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5. Tillable Acres Average GSR; 
6. Total Farm Average Com Yield; 
7. Tillable Acres Average Com Yield; 
C. Buildings and Improvements; 
1. Buildings Condition (Check One); Obsolete ; Poor _ 
Average ; Above Average ; Excellent 
2. Specialized Facilities (Check Where Appropriate); 
Confinement Hog Operation ; Confinement Cattle 
Operation ; Harvester Silo(s) ; Other 
(Describe) 
3. Terraces (Check One) : None ; Some ; 
Extensive 
4. Tilling (Check One) ; None ; Some ; 
Extensive 
V. CHAEIACTERISIICS OF BUYER 
A. Form of Ownership (Check One); Owner-Operator ; Local 
Landlord ; Absentee Landlord 
B. Type of Organization (Check One); 
1. Single Proprietor 
2. Partnership ; Number of Owner-Operators 
3. Family Corporation ; Number of Owner-Operators 
4. Other Corporation 
C. Size of Operation Before Acquisition (If Owner-Operator) ; 
1. Number of Acres Owned; 
2. Number of Acres Rented-In; 
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3. Number of Tractors (over 20 hp) Owned: 
a. Horsepower; ; ; ; ; ; 
b. Age: ; ; ; ; ; 
4. Number of Self-Propelled Combines : 
a. Number of Rows on Com Head; ; ; ; 
b. Age; ; ; ; 
D. Location of Buyer (If Owner-Operator); 
1. Distance from Farm Base to New Acquisition: miles 
E. Personal Characteristics of Buyer ^  Time of Acquisition (If 
Owner-Operated): 
1. Number Years Farming of Owner-Operator(s) ; 
2. Highest Year of School Completed of Owner-Operator(s); 
3. Number of Anticipated Owner-Operators to Join Farming Unit 
During Next Five Years; 
4. Amount of Off-Farm Income of Owner-Operator(s) and 
Family(ies) (Check One); None ; $1-5,000 ; 
$5,001-910,000 ; $10,001-$15,000 ; 
$15,000 and above 
5. Amount of Net Worth of Owner-Operator(s) and Family(ies) 
(Check One); $0-$50,000 ; $50,001-$100,000 ; 
$100,001-$150,000 ; $150,001-$200,000 ; 
$200,001 and above 
COMMENTS; 
